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THE DES LABYRINTH
HARLAN S. ABRAHAMS*
AND
BOBBEE JOAN MUSGRAVE**
The temptation seems to be constant to find certainty where it
does not exist rather than to accept the existence of uncer-
tainty and choose how to act in the face of it.1
I. INTRODUCTION
DES plaintiffs2 face an array of complex hurdles. Even
before considering legal action, they encounter life-threatening
* Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
B.S. 1972, University of Nebraska College of Business Administration; J.D. 1974, Univer-
sity of Nebraska; LL.M. 1975, Harvard University.
** Member of the bars of Washington and Illinois. B.A. 1974, J.D. 1977, Southern
Illinois University.
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P.S., of Tacoma, Washington, and especially Mr. John L. Messina, for the valuable ex-
periences we gained during Ms. Musgrave's association with them. Much of the legal and
medical background information used in this article is derived from Ms. Musgrave's par-
ticipation in a number of DES cases.
We also wish to thank our student assistant, Ms. Tracy Borge, for her valuable re-
search endeavors and her willingness to serve as our sounding board.
1. Lindgren, Social Theory and Judicial Choice: Damages and Federal Statutes, 28
BUFFALO L. REV. 741, 752 (1979).
2. "Diethylstilbestrol (DES) is a man-made estrogen, first approved by the Federal
Drug Administration (FDA) in 1947 for use in complications during preg-
nancy-specifically, to prevent miscarriages." Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of
Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 963 (1978) [hereinafter FORDHAm Comment]
(written by Naomi Sheiner, this article is the seminal legal discussion of products liabil-
ity issues arising from the use of DES). The drug is associated with the development of
abnormalities among the users' offspring, both male and female, most notably clear cell
adenocarcinoma among "DES daughters." See id. at 964-65. Our analysis of the legal
issues arising from this association is premised on our belief that DES plaintiffs are enti-
tled to redress for their suffering from an industry that negligently marketed a noneffi-
cacious, dangerous drug without adequate testing. See notes 134-208 and accompanying
text infra. Although the analysis in this article is limited to the effects of DES on fe-
males exposed to it in utero, evidence suggests that the drug also caused abnormalities in
males exposed in utero. Robboy, Prat & Welch, Vaginal Cervical Pathology Associated
with Prenatal Exposure to Diethylstilbestrol, in ESTROGENS AND CANCERS 173
(Silverberg & Majors, eds. 1978).
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situations and alien medical procedures.3 Imagine a young wo-
man, nineteen years old, who seeks medical attention because of
abnormal bleeding during her menstrual cycle. A review of her
medical history discloses a background of menstrual problems
commencing with the onset of puberty. The subsequent medical
examination by her gynecologist reveals adenosis4 in the vaginal
tract.
Recognizing an association between adenosis and fetal expo-
sure to DES, the young woman's gynecologist seeks information
from her mother concerning the mother's drug history during
pregnancy. The mother recalls taking DES from the second
month of pregnancy until the birth of her daughter. Armed with
this information, the young woman is referred to a gynecologist-
oncologist at a nearby research hospital. A biopsy is performed,
and the diagnosis is clear cell adenocarcinoma in the vaginal
tract. A hysterectomy and a vaginectomy 5 are performed.
After a ten-day stay in the hospital following the surgery,
the young woman discovers numerous complications caused by
the surgery: lack of bladder control, increased susceptibility to
bladder infections, and pain during sexual intercourse. More-
over, she becomes increasingly depressed over her inability to
bear children, anxious about her frequent postsurgery examina-
tions, and fearful that her cancer might recur. In frustration, she
finally consults an attorney. She has just entered the DES
labyrinth.
Confronting the DES plaintiff are piles of legal and medical
literature,6 a maze of novel problems of proof, and many paths
3. See J. BICHLER, DES DAUGHTER chs. 2-5 (1981).
4. See notes 22-35 and accompanying text infra.
5. A vaginectomy is an excision of the vagina or a segment thereof. STEDMAN'S MEDI-
CAL DICTIONARY 1526 (4th unabr. lawyers' ed. 1976).
6. For legal literature, see, e.g., FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2; Comment, Be-
yond Enterprise Liability in DES Cases-Sindell, 14 IND. L. REv. 695 (1981); Comment,
Manufacturers' Liability Based on a Market Share Theory: Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 16 TULSA L.J. 286 (1980); Comment, Diethylstilbestrol: Estension of Federal Class
Action Procedures to Generic Drug Litigation, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 461 (1980); Note, 4 AM.
J. TRIAL ADvoc. 492 (1980); Note, 12 J. MAR. L. REv. 201 (1980); Note, 49 U. CIN. L. REV.
926 (1980); Note, 49 UMKC L. Rav. 245 (1981); Note, 42 U. PriT. L. REv. 669 (1981);
Note, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 571 (1981). For medical literature, see, e.g., Dunn & Green, Cysts
of the Epididymis, Cancer of the Cervix, Granular Cell Myoblastoma, and Other Le-
sions After Estrogen Injection in Newborn Mice, 31 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 425 (1963);
Fu, Robboy & Prat, Nuclear DNA Study of Vaginal and Cervical Squamous Cell Ab-
normalities in DES Exposed Progeny, 52 J. OBST. & GYN. 129 (1978); Greenwald, Bar-
664 [Vol. 33
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss4/5
1982] THE DES LABYRINTH
through that maze. The legal literature tends to focus narrowly
on one or two of the novel issues without depicting the range of
problems characterizing DES litigation. This article instead por-
trays the complexity of the maze. Rather than dwelling on iso-
lated components of the legal process, we trace the path taken
by the plaintiff from beginning to end. In no other way can the
complexity of the DES labyrinth be appreciated.
The DES plaintiff sees stretching before her the numerous
routes she may take. Each represents a distinct theory of recov-
ery: negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, misrepresenta-
tion, and breach of warranty.7 The theories are interrelated; the
paths cross frequently.8 Each has recognizable branches; negli-
gence, for example, has been "charged in the design, testing, in-
vestigation, experimenting with, manufacturing, packaging, mar-
keting, distributing, inspecting, promoting and labeling of the
drugs."' We select one branch-negligent failure to test ade-
quately-and follow it, knowing that each of the other theories
raises important issues"° and that each theory should be alleged
low, Nasca & Burnett, Vaginal Cancer After Maternal Treatment with Synthetic Estro-
gens, 285 N. ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971); Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of
the Vagina, 284 N. ENG. J. MED. 878 (1971); McLachlon, Newbold & Bullock, Long-
Term Effects on the Female Mouse Genital Tract Associated with Prenatal Exposure
to Diethylstilbestrol, 40 CANCER RESEARCH 3988 (1980); Poskanzer & Herbst, Epidemiol-
ogy of Vaginal Adenosis and Adenocarcinoma Associated with Exposure to Stilbestrol
in Utero, 39 CANCER 1892 (1977); Ulfelder, The Stilbestrol-Adenosis-Carcinoma Syn-
drome, 38 CANCER 426 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 66-67, 289 N.W.2d 20, 22
(1980); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 560, 420 A.2d 1305, 1309 (1980).
8. For example, to establish a breach of implied warranty in Michigan, the plaintiff
must show "a defect in the product." Abel, 94 Mich. App. at 70, 289 N.W.2d at 24. Proof
of a product defect is similarly crucial to a strict liability claim in California. See Note,
42 U. Pirr. L. REV. 669, 679-85 (1981).
9. Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 560, 420 A.2d at 1309.
10. Two particularly interesting issues that do not arise in the failure to test context
are the potential for basing a claim on overpromotion of DES and the relationship be-
tween the lack of efficacy of DES and the exceptions to the strict liability standards of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). In connection with the overpromotion
issue, compare Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr.
45 (1973) (overpromotion of the antibiotic Chloromycetin held to be a proper basis for
claim) and Note, 10 GA. ST. B.J. 450 (1974); with FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at
964 n.4.
In connection with the relationship between efficacy and § 402A, note that RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k (1965), entitled "Unavoidably Unsafe
Products" and written with particular focus on new and experimental drugs, essentially
creates an exception from strict liability for such drugs and reintroduces "rules of negli-
gence embodying the longstanding concepts of a lack of due care and foreseeability of
3
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by plaintiff's counsel. We select negligent failure to test because
the substantive evidence on that issue is especially compelling:
[S]erious questions had ... been presented, some prior to
FDA approval and others prior to use by plaintiff's mother,
concerning the drug's potential carcinogenic effect and its effi-
cacy for accidents of pregnancy.
... It was well known, before FDA approval was sought,
that substances given a pregnant woman would pass through
the placenta into the fetus. It was also well known that there
were available tests on mice which, if conducted, would have
demonstrated within six months the danger of cancer develop-
ing in the fetus after it had reached maturity. In fact, three
prominent Chicago physiologists had administered DES to rats
and mice in 1939 and concluded that the hormone crossed the
placenta and had malforming action on the fetus. In 1938, Dr.
Charles Dodd, one of the British researchers responsible for
synthesizing DES, had published a paper with respect to his
findings in relation to DES. In his summary of conclusions, Dr.
Dodd stated that DES could actually cause miscarriages or
abortions, not save them. In the late '40's, one of the studies
cited in Lilly's supplemental application specifically
questioned:
2. Is diethylstilbestrol in such large doses carcinogenic,
and as such unsafe to give even to pregnant women?
3. Can diethylstilbestrol in any way affect the glandular
balance of the child in utero, particularly the male child?
... .These reservations, however, were not noted on the ap-
plication. Several other studies, appearing in the period 1950-
the risk." Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 576, 420 A.2d at 1318. Given the evidence, which
was available before DES was marketed to pregnant women, that the drug was never
effective in preventing miscarriages, see Parts II.C. & II.E. infra, plaintiffs have asserted
that if they can demonstrate such a lack of efficacy, the provisions of Comment k, which
presuppose "an apparently useful and desirable product," do not apply, and the general
rules governing strict liability control the case. See Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 575-77,
420 A.2d at 1317-19; Keeton, Products Liability-Drugs & Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REv.
131, 135, 141-43 (1972); FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 972 n.25, 967-68 n.18. The
court in Ferrigno agreed with the plaintiff's assertion: "Did it reasonably appear to be
efficacious at the time it was manufactured, marketed, and distributed?... In my view,
if it did not, comment k rules will not apply and the established rules of strict liability
defined in the machine cases will." 175 N.J. Super. at 577, 420 A.2d at 1319. Resolution
of this issue carries implications far beyond the DES context; it also provides another
example of how the paths representing different theories of recovery-here negligence
and strict liability-intersect. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
666 [Vol. 33
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53 questioned the efficacy of DES for complications of preg-
nancy. There was, therefore, in existence... [before DES was
marketed], not only doubts as to efficacy but also scientific
criticism of the lack of proper control in those studies which
had advocated use of DES. Despite these reservations, it is
undisputed that none of the companies producing or market-
ing DES had performed any tests on the drug's effect on the
fetus itself, either in humans or in animals, although DES
was specifically aimed at the placenta and fetus.1 1
Yet few plaintiffs reach the issue of breaching the standard
of care. Before that problem is encountered, the plaintiff must
demonstrate a duty to her while she was a fetus;12 she must con-
vince the court that the applicable statute of limitation did not
begin running until the manifestation of her injury in adoles-
cence;13 and she must negotiate the cause-in-fact impasse: who
manufactured those pills her mother took nearly twenty years
ago?14 Even after negotiating the substantive negligence stan-
dard, 5 the plaintiff must prove legal causation through statisti-
cal correlation rather than observable cause-and-effect,' since
today no one knows what actually causes cancer generally, let
alone the rare form of clear cell carcinoma afflicting DES daugh-
ters.17 Finally, she must prove her damages-the dollar worth of
her lost capacity to bear children,18 the value of her postsurgery
traumas, 9 and the cost of the time bomb possibly awaiting her
during menopause.20
11. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, ., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 629-30 (1981)
(emphasis added).
12. See Part II.A. infra.
13. See id.
14. See Part H.B. infra.
15. See Part II.C. infra.
16. See Part IID. infra.
17. See id.; FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 964-65 n.5.
18. Dr Howard Ulfelder, a leading DES authority, continues to believe that hyster-
ectomy is the most successful and therefore preferable method for treating clear cell
adenocarcinoma. See Ulfelder, supra note 2, at 427-428.
19. See, e.g., J. BICHLER, supra note 3, at 128-29, 152-53 (1981).
20. A number of studies posit the expectation that DES-related cancer will occur
with increasing frequency as women who were exposed in utero grow older, since vaginal
cancer is so rare among young women. See, e.g., Herbst, Poskanzer, Robboy, Friedlander
& Scully, Prenatal Exposure to Stilbestrol, 292 N. ENG. J. MED. 334, 339 (1975); Stafl &
Mattingly, Vaginal Adenosis: A Precancerous Lesion?, 120 AM. J. OasT. & GYN. 666, 672
(1974). While participating in several DES cases, Ms. Musgrave noted that some physi-
cians spoke informally of menopause as the focal point of their concern, based on the
1982] 667
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For those who do reach the damages issue, we offer an alter-
native to traditional measures.21 We propose restitution-the
disgorgement of profits unjustly enriching the drug industry-as
the proper remedy for those plaintiffs who successfully traverse
the DES labyrinth.
II. A ROADMAP OF OBSTACLES
A. Prenatal Exposure and Adult Damages
Upon entering the maze, the DES plaintiff immediately
confronts two impediments, both of which focus on the timing of
her injuries. Resolutions of the issues concerning both the duty
to a fetus and the running of the statute of limitation require
examination of the progressive effects of exposure to DES in
utero. Those effects begin with adenosis, which has been called a
"precancerous" condition.22 Adenosis is "tissue placed abnor-
mally on the cervix or vagina, '23 and it reveals itself as fibrous
ridges in those organs, cervical erosion, and failure of part of the
vagina or cervix to stain with iodine.24 This cellular alteration
may occur in utero: "It is . . . possible that stilbestrol alters fe-
tal vaginal cells in utero, with changes that do not become mani-
fest in a malignant form until years later."25 Another possibility
is that "an increase in adenosis occurs at menarche ... and re-
sults in greater quantities of benign tissue at risk for malignant
change."
'26
Either way, "adenosis has been reported in 30% to 90% of
postpubertal girls. . . whose mothers received diethylstilbestrol
fact that vaginal cancer began occurring after puberty among DES daughters, and the
fact that menopause is the time during women's lives, in addition to puberty and preg-
nancy, when hormonal changes are at their maximum. See also Herbst, Kurman, Scully
& Poskanzer, Clear-Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Genital Tract in Young Females: Reg-
istry Report, 287 N. ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1263 (1972); Whitehead, Townsend, Pryse-Da-
vies, Path, Ryder & King, Effects of Estrogens and Progestins on the Biochemistry and
Morphology of the Postmenopausal Endomentrium, 305 N. ENG. J. MmD. 1599 (1981).
21. See Part II.E. infra.
22. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 965; Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer,
supra note 6, at 880 ("predisposing condition"); Staff & Mattingly, supra note 20 ("pre-
cancerous lesion").
23. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 965 n.10.
24. Poskanzer & Herbst, supra note 6, at 1893-94.
25. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra note 6, at 880.
26. Id.
[Vol. 33
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or a closely related congener during pregnancy. '2 7 At the same
time, benign adenosis is found "in over 97% of vaginal clear cell
adenocarcinomas, whether a history of DES exposure is con-
firmed or not, even though primary vaginal adenosis is almost
unknown in the normal population in this age group."28 These
statistics prompted one leading authority to conclude that the
"high concurrence of benign vaginal adenosis with these adeno-
carcinomas suggests that an anomaly of vaginal epithelial devel-
opment may be a predisposing condition."2"
Thus, "[w]hen carcinoma is found, coexistent benign ade-
nosis is the rule. '3 0 The transition from the benign condition to
the malignant "is assumed to be the probable sequence of
events."31 Detection of the cancer then becomes crucial. Most
cases are diagnosed by examination and biopsy in young girls
who complain of "abnormal bleeding or bloody intermenstrual
discharge. A few are detected in the presymptomatic stage of
disease during examination carried out because of known prena-
tal exposure to DES. '3 2 Once the cancer is detected, treatment
by radical surgery ss or radiation3 4 follows; in a significant per-
centage of cases treated by these methods, recurrence and death
may nevertheless result.3 5
Two legal issues arise from this sequence of events that be-
gins with fetal exposure to DES in utero and ends with detec-
tion and treatment of cancer during postpubertal adolescence.
Both center on the fact that DES affects the plaintiff when she
is exposed to it in utero; in essence, the injury occurs at that
time, although the damages do not become manifest until years
later. Accordingly, the DES plaintiff must demonstrate, first,
that the drug companies that marketed DES to her mother had
a duty to her as an unborn fetus and, second, that her action has
not been barred by the applicable statute of limitation.
27. 40 Fed. Reg. 32,773 (1975).
28. Ulfelder, supra note 6, at 428.
29. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra note 6, at 880.
30. Ulfelder, supra note 6, at 430.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 427.
33. See note 18 and accompanying text supra; FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at
965 n.9.
34. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 965 n.9.
35. One group of women who received such treatments experienced a 24% recur-
rence rate and a 16% fatality rate. Id.
S1982] 669
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1. Duty to a Fetus.-The first American case to consider
whether a person could recover for a prenatal common-law tort
was Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,36 in which Justice
Holmes, writing for the Massachusetts Supreme Court, held that
recovery for injuries to a fetus would not lie. This rule remained
virtually uncontroverted until Bonbrest v. Kotz in 1946. 37 Dean
Prosser cites two reasons for the original holding:
First, that the defendant could owe no duty of conduct to a
person who was not in existence at the time of his action; and
second, that the difficulty of proving any causal connection be-
tween negligence and damage was too great, and there was too
much danger of fictitious claims.38
Nearly sixty years after Dietrich, Chief Justice Brogan's dis-
sent in Stemmer v. Kline39 attacked the Holmes opinion, asking
"why the court should feel restrained from breaking with the
doctrine that a child en ventre sa mere has no separate being in
the field of torts when in every other field of law a child has a
separate being, is a person, if being in that category is for its
benefit. ' 40 Four years later, based on increasing acceptance of
such criticism, 41 Bonbrest decided that a child, if born alive,
could recover for the consequences of prenatal injuries.42 This
decision triggered a trend that Prosser calls "the most spectacu-
lar abrupt reversal of a well settled rule in the whole history of
the law of torts. ' 43 Today, all jurisdictions allow a cause of ac-
tion for prenatal injuries if the child is born alive.4'
Nevertheless, the DES plaintiff may have difficulty with her
first obstacle in those few jurisdictions that require the injury to
occur after viability,45 because DES was usually administered
36, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
37. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
38, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 335 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as W. PROSSER].
39. 128 N.J.L. 445, 465-66, 26 A.2d 684, 686-87 (1942).
40. Gordon, The Unborn Plaintiff, 63 MicH. L. REv. 579, 583 (1965).
41. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 336.
42. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 336.
44, Id. at 337; FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 971 n.24.
45. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 337; FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 971
n.24.
670 [Vol. 33
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early in pregnancy48 and because "substantial medical authority
. .. indicates that congenital structural defects occasioned by
environmental factors can be sustained only within the earliest
stages of the previable period. 4 7 In the context of DES litiga-
tion, the reasons for rejecting the minority position that requires
viability become even stronger when it is recalled that a duty
should extend to all foreseeable plaintiffs. Because "DES was
specifically aimed at the placenta and fetus' 48 and because "[i]t
was well known, before FDA approval was sought, that sub-
stances given a pregnant woman would pass through the pla-
centa into the fetus, 49 the DES daughter should have no diffi-
culty in showing that the drug industry owed her a duty while
she was a fetus. She was a quite foreseeable plaintiff.
2. Statutes of Limitation.-Furthermore, the DES daughter
should have no difficulty satisfying the statute of limitation in
the many jurisdictions where the "discovery rule" prevents the
statute from running until she becomes or should become aware
of her injuries.50 But an alarming trend may deprive her of her
cause of action even before she is aware of her injury if she is
unfortunate enough to live in a state that has adopted a "date-
of-sale" statute of limitation.51 Responding to questionable 52 as-
sertions of a crisis in products liability litigation and in the re-
sulting increase in insurance premiums, sixteen states since
1977 5 have enacted date-of-sale statutes of limitation.
46. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 971 n.24.
47. Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge in the Law Relating to Prenatal Inju-
ries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 563 (1962) (emphasis in original).
48. Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, -, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625, 630 (1981).
49. Id. at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
50. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 144; Burch, A Practitioner's Guide
to the Statutes of Limitations in Product Liability Suits, 5 BALT. L. REv. 23, 36-40
(1975); Massery, Date of Sale Statutes of Limitation-A New Immunity for Product
Suppliers, 1977 INS. L.J. 535, 538; FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 970-71 n.23.
51. See, e.g., Burch, supra note 50, at 23; Massery, supra note 50, at 535; Phillips,
An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56
N.C.L. REv. 663 (1978); Note, The Statute of Limitations in Strict Products Liability
Actions, 24 BUFFALO L. REv. 477 (1974-75); Note, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation:
An Effective Means of Implementing Change in Products Liability Law, 30 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 123 (1979); Comment, State Legislative Restrictions on Product Liability
Actions, 29 MERCER L. REv. 619 (1978).
52. Note, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation, supra note 51, at 124 n.6. See gener-
ally Nader, The Corporate Assault on Products Liability, 1977 TRiAL 38.
53. The first state was Utah. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977). The other jurisdic-
tions include Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 5-502 (1979); Arizona, ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §
1982]
9
Abrahams and Musgrave: The Des Labyrinth
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The feeling of the respective legislatures was perhaps best
stated by the sponsor of the Utah act who explained the stat-
ute of limitations provision as a way "to prevent lawsuits where
products manufactured 15 to 30 years ago have come back to
haunt manufacturers when, at the time of manufacture, tech-
nology and safety practices were either nonexistent or not ap-
plicable to the industry.5'
However relevant this reasoning may be to strict liability cases,
it is totally inapplicable to the DES case in which the plaintiff
seeks to prove negligent failure to test, since the plaintiff in such
a case must show that the drug manufacturer did know or
should have known of the cancer-causing risks of its drug at the
time of the sale.55
The distinction between the two types of limitation is "es-
sential.. . for DES plaintiffs because it may be twenty years or
more before the carcinogenic effects of the drug become mani-
fest. '"58 On one hand, the discovery rule perfectly suits the con-
12-551 (1978); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (1977); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (1978); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (1978); Georgia,
GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(2) (1978); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (Burns
1978); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin 1978); Nebraska, NEr. REV.
STAT. § 25-224(1), (2) (1978); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (1978);
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (1979); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1)
(1977); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (1978); South Dakota, S.D. COMFED LAWS
ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (1978); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1978).
Among these statutes are several notable differences. The time period during which
an action may be commenced ranges from five years after sale of the product in Ken-
tucky to twelve years in Arizona, Florida, and New Hampshire. In addition, several stat-
utes are structured differently. Some limitation periods are measured from the date of
manufacture, as in North Dakota and Utah, while other limits reflect the anticipated life
of the product, as in Tennessee. A number of date-of-sale limitations supplement the
date-of-injury limitation, which further restricts the ability to bring a products liability
action. E.g., Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 6, § 5-502 (1979); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
21-403(3) (1977); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (1978); Florida, Frw.
STAT. ANN. § 95-031(2) (1978); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5 (Burns 1978); Ne-
braska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(1), (2) (1978); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
507-D:2 (1978). One state has made an exception to the statute of limitation for negli-
gence or breach of warranty on the part of the manufacturer or seller. ARiz. REV. STAT. §
12-551 (1978). Still other states formulated a rebuttable presumption within their stat-
utes. Under these statutes, the product is presumed to be nondefective upon expiration
of the date-of-sale limitation. E.g., Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (1977);
Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310 (Baldwin 1978); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-01.1-05 (1979).
54. Comment, State Legislative Restrictions, supra note 51, at 627.
55. See Part II.C. infra.
56. FORDIEAM Comment, supra note 2, at 970 n.23.
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text from which it arose: medical malpractice cases and products
liability cases involving drugs57 in which the plaintiff, however
diligent, may not become aware of her injuries until long after
the tortious conduct. On the other hand, "it would seem that
rather than protecting innocent manufacturers from unwar-
ranted claims, the adoption of the Model [date-of-sale] Bill may
result in shielding clearly culpable defendants from the valid
claims of severely injured plaintiffs. '58 Specifically citing as one
of his examples the problems that DES daughters would face
under date-of-sale statutes of limitation, Ralph Nader genera-
lized the basic policy argument against this "corporate assault
on products liability"59 law:
There is now a tendency in corporate circles ... to create a
scare based upon wholly-insupportable allegations. [This] is
the case in the products liability struggle.
For instance, until a year ago I used to hear from insur-
ance circles that there were one million products liability cases
filed in the courts. Everytine I wrote the insurance companies
to challenge that statement, they could not support it. This
confirms the belief of many lawyers that only a fraction of the
injuries due to dangerously designed or constructed products,
less than one percent, are brought to justice.
This illustrates an interesting point about the rights that
we have in this country. As long as they are merely rights on
paper they are generally publicized by the established inter-
ests, particularly those who want to compare our system favor-
ably with others. But the moment some of these rights begin to
have an effect, the moment they are used, like products liabil-
ity rights, the moment a few people start getting compensation
for grievous injuries, then the clarion call is, "The system is
being abused," and it is time to curtail these rights-not time,
please note-to curtail the hazards.60
Mr. Nader's remarks seem particularly pertinent to the battles
over DES; until late 1980 only one case had gone to judgment in
favor of a plaintiff.61
Even more disconcerting than the policy arguments are the
57. Burch, supra note 50, at 36-40.
58. Massery, supra note 50, at 544.
59. Nader, supra note 52, at 40.
60. Id. at 38-39.
61. J. BICHLER, supra note 3, at 188.
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constitutional objections to date-of-sale statutes of limitation.
Although the courts are split over the constitutionality of such
statutes,62 the Florida Supreme Court in Diamond v. E.R.
Squibb & Sons recently expressed the better view.63 Responding
to a motion to dismiss based on the state's twelve-year date-of-
sale statute, the DES plaintiffs in Diamond argued that applica-
tion of the statute to them would altogether abolish their right
of action in violation of due process principles and article I, sec-
tion 21 of the Florida Constitution." That section ensures that
the "courts shall be open to every person for redress of any in-
jury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or
delay."' 16 The court agreed:
The operation of [the date-of-sale statute] in this case has
the same effect as it had in Overland Construction Co. v. Sir-
mons .... The statute of limitations operated there to bar
the cause of action before it ever accrued, so that no judicial
forum was available to the aggrieved plaintiff. A majority of
the members of this Court declared the limitations period un-
constitutional as applied on the ground that it violated article
I, section 21, Florida Constitution.
We find that binding precedent exists because petitioners'
right of action was barred before it ever existed, as in Over-
land. We therefore hold that as applied in this case, [the stat-
ute] violates the Florida Constitution's guaranty of access to
courts. 66
The same result seems compelled by analysis of date-of-sale
limitations under federal standards governing due process and
equal protection.67 Accordingly, neither date-of-sale statutes of
limitation nor allegations that drug manufacturers owed her no
duty should prevent the DES plaintiff from plunging deeper into
the labryinth.
62. Compare Tyson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 So. 2d 263 (Ala. 1981);
Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 418 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. 1981); and Purk v. Federal Press
Co., 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980) with Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572
(Fla. 1979) and Diamond v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
63. 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
64. Id. at 672.
65. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
66. 397 So. 2d at 672 (emphasis omitted).
67. See Massery, supra note 50, at 545-48; Note, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limita-
tion, supra note 51, at 145-52.
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B. Cause-In-Fact and Manufacturer Identity
Having demonstrated a duty to her while she was a fetus, as
well as the impropriety of barring her action under the applica-
ble statute of limitation, the DES plaintiff next encounters the
issue that has proved fatal to numerous DES claims: the identi-
fication of the proper defendants, a necessary component of the
cause-in-fact requirement.68 Given the lapse of time between her
mother's pregnancy and her present lawsuit, it is very difficult
for the DES plaintiff to trace her mother's prescription to spe-
cific pharmacies and then to specific manufacturers. Inability to
identify the particular producers of the pills her mother took re-
quires the DES daughter to rely on substitute methods for satis-
fying the cause-in-fact element. If she fails, her suit is over even
before she can argue that she is the victim of negligence.
Four substitutes for precise defendant identification have
been accepted by a growing minority of courts." The bulk of
legal literature concerning DES litigation focuses on these sub-
stitutes, 0 because few cases ever move beyond the cause-in-fact
inquiry. Although comparisons of the four theories abound, too
little attention is paid to their practical similarities. To under-
stand these similarities, a description of the drug industry's con-
duct in producing and marketing DES is necessary.
"The drug industry is one of both high profits and high re-
turns,7 in which parallel practices abound. 2 Nowhere have
such patterns been more evident than in the development of
DES: common chemical standards, uniform labelling and prod-
uct literature, and generic marketing techniques all combine to
hinder the DES plaintiff's ability to specify the proper defen-
dants. 7- A group of twelve manufacturers guided the industry
through Federal Drug Administration (FDA) approval proceed-
ings that eventually led to the marketing of DES. After initial
68. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 972.
69. See notes 82-120 and accompanying text infra.
70. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 978-1007; Recent Developments, 4 Am. J.
TRiAL Aivoc. 492, 492-98 (1980); Case Note, 16 TULSA L.J. 286, 298-316 (1980); Recent
Cases, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 926 (1980); Comment, 49 UMKC L. Rxv. 245, 250-56 (1981);
Note, 42 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1981); Note, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 571 (1981).
71. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 975.
72. Id. at 976-78; Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
73. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 975. See also notes 102 & 114 and accom-
panying text infra.
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applications to market the drug were rejected,
twelve manufacturers, including Lilly, were convened at the
behest of the FDA and agreed to cooperate with each other in
the approval process. Thereafter, these twelve worked through
a voluntarily formed committee known as the "Small Commit-
tee," which consisted of representatives of four of these compa-
nies and which was chaired by Lilly.... The Small Commit-
tee pooled all clinical data pertaining to DES for submission.
Lilly's literature became the model for the literature used as
the package insert.... Although the subsequent FDA ap-
proval was limited to use for several conditions, none of which
related to pregnancy, there was evidence . .. that Lilly was
even then contemplating use of DES for toxemia in pregnancy.
In 1947, Lilly and other drug companies filed supplemen-
tal applications with the FDA for permission to market DES
for treatment of certain complications of pregnancy involving
early termination of the pregnancy or death of the fetus. The
dosage contemplated for this use was several times stronger
than the maximum permitted in 1941.7"
Approval of the supplemental applications triggered manu-
facturing of DES by hundreds of drug companies15 and prescrip-
tion of the drug for millions of pregnant women.7 Despite the
number of DES manufacturers, the original applicants contin-
ued to dominate the market: "it has been estimated that Eli
Lilly & Co. and five or six other manufacturers accounted for
90% of the market for this drug. ' 77 Expert evidence indicates
that Lilly was the largest producer of DES7 8 with a 45 % share of
the market.
79
In 1971 the FDA responded to studies linking DES use with
later development of vaginal cancer in the users' daughters by
contraindicating DES for use by pregnant women.80 Thus the
drug was "effectively banned. . . for this purpose both because
of its danger and ineffectiveness." 81
74. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at -- , 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
75. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 964.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 977.
78. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at , 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627, 633.
79. Id. at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627, 634.
80. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 966.
81. Id.
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Armed with such evidence, DES plaintiffs today assert four
distinct but related theories to overcome the traditional require-
ment of identifying the proper defendants with precision. "Con-
cert of action" and "alternative liability" both represent novel
applications of established theories; "enterprise liability" repre-
sents a novel synthesis of concerted action and alternative liabil-
ity; and "modified alternate liability," often called "market
share" liability, represents an innovative extension of an estab-
lished theory. Each theory satisfies the cause-in-fact require-
ment by identifying a group of joint tortfeasors rather than
specifying the precise manufacturer of the pills taken by the
plaintiff's mother. The judiciary's reception of these theories has
been mixed; the cause-in-fact issue accordingly remains one of
the most difficult impediments encountered by DES daughters.
1. Concerted Action.-Prosser explains that "[t]he original
meaning of a 'joint tort' was that of vicarious liability for con-
certed action. '82 The principle holds that
[a]l those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to
commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by
cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to
the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their bene-
fit, are equally liable with him.8
Under concerted action each defendant becomes a "substantial
factor" in causing the plaintiff's injury because all of the joined
defendants have combined to generate the harm." Evidence of a
tacit agreement suffices to establish the theory,85 and inference
of such a tacit understanding may be based on consciously par-
allel or imitative conduct.88 The leading products liability case is
Hall v. E.L DuPont De Nemours & Co.,8 7 which applied the con-
certed action theory to the dynamite blasting cap industry.
Only a few courts, however, have accepted the concerted ac-
tion theory in the context of DES litigation. In Abel v. Eli Lilly
82. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 291.
83. Id. at 292.
84. Id. at 240; FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 980.
85. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 292.
86. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 980, 983, 984. Useful analogies are
found in antitrust conspiracy cases. See id. at 983.
87. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See also FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at
981-82.
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& Co.,88 the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a summary
judgment for defendants, holding that allegations of concerted
action do state a proper cause of action, but the court failed to
specify what evidence would suffice to establish the joint tort.89
More recently the New York Supreme Court in Bichler v. Eli
Lilly & Co.,90 affirmed the first 1 final judgment in favor of a
DES daughter based on the concerted action theory. The New
York court held that the evidence of acting in concert was "over-
whelming ' 92 after detailing the grounds for inferring both ex-
press agreement and tacit understanding rooted in conscious
parallelism:
The original cooperation by the twelve manufacturers and
pooling of information, the agreement on the same basic chem-
ical formula, and the adoption of Lilly's literature as a model
for package inserts for joint submission to the FDA in 1941,
can rationally be construed as an express agreement for pur-
poses of finding concerted action, even if such cooperation was
first invited by the FDA. And Lilly, it will be remembered, was
the leader of the voluntarily formed Small Committee, which
organized and expedited the effort for the twelve. By this ac-
tivity, these manufacturers were acting on behalf of all later
manufacturers of DES inasmuch as they set the pattern for ac-
ceptance by the FDA. There was evidence in abundance of
conscious parallel activity thereafter by the drug companies
which later sought FDA approval of DES for use in treating
risks of pregnancy, evidence from which may be inferred a tacit
understanding. In fact, by terms of the FDA supplemental ap-
plication form, applicants for this new usage of DES could, and
did, rely on the data contained in the original application for
DES usage concerning which no change was proposed. There
was also some evidence that Lilly encouraged others to so rely.
And, again, it is to be remembered that the data of the original
application for DES approval used by each drug company was
that which was commonly agreed upon and submitted by the
original twelve manufacturers, in accordance with the work of
the Small Committee chaired by Lilly. It follows that all such
reliance 'and cooperation was beneficial to each producer of
88. 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980).
89. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
90. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
91. J. BICHLER, supra note 3, at 188.
92. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
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DES. It is obvious that to hold up a product's distribution for
further testing would not be economically feasible in the race
to win a market share. Although Lilly was the second manufac-
turer to make the supplemental application, it was also the
leading manufacturer, and subsequent applications by others
requested the same standard new dosage and relied on the
same set of research studies as Lilly."
Other courts, however, have rejected the concerted action the-
ory, holding that its application "to this situation would expand
the doctrine far beyond its intended scope and would render vir-
tually any manufacturer liable for the defective products of an
entire industry.
9 4
2. Alternative Liability.-Rather than relying on concerted
action, the DES litigant might persuade the court to apply the
theory of alternative liability:
When all defendants have acted tortiously, but not in concert,
and not all have caused the plaintiff's injury, liability has been
imposed on all defendants under the theory of alternative lia-
bility. Under this theory the burden of proof shifts to each de-
fendant, who must prove that he did not cause the injury. In
Summers v. Tice the plaintiff could not determine which of
two negligent hunters fired the shot that injured him. Rather
than exonerate both tortfeasors because plaintiff could not
prove by a preponderance of the evidence which defendant was
responsible, the court held both defendants jointly and sever-
ally liable.95
This theory was also accepted by the Michigan Court of Appeals
in Abel96 and by the Superior Court of New Jersey in Ferrigno v.
Eli Lilly & Co. 97 The court in Ferrigno specified five reasons for
its acceptance. First, the defendants were members of a group m
which every member was potentially blameworthy;98 second, the
defendants owed a special duty to the plaintiffs;99 third, the
93. Id.
94. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 605, 607 P.2d 924, 933, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, 141 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1981).
95. Note, 49 U. CIN. L. RE V. 926, 930 (1980).
96. Abel, 94 Mich. App. at 73-77, 289 N.W.2d at 25-27.
97. 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980).
98. Id. at 567, 420 A.2d at 1313.
99. Id. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1313.
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plaintiffs were totally innocent;100 fourth, the plaintiffs' injuries,
unrelated to the purpose for ingesting DES, were not foreseeable
by them;101 and
[f]ifth, while defendants in the DES cases may not have know-
ledge superior to that of plaintiffs as to identification, the frus-
tration which plaintiffs have continuously experienced has
been caused to some degree by defendants themselves, albeit
inadvertently. Defendants marketed the drug generically, mak-
ing it a fungible item without a name tag. In addition, the drug
by its very nature did not give any clues of its i effects until a
generation after its use, long after any records that any con-
sumer might keep were reasonably discarded. 10
2
The court's ultimate focus on the reasons why a DES plaintiff
has difficulty identifying the manufacturer is especially appro-
priate in light of the marketing practices of the drug industry.103
Nevertheless, most courts reject alternative liability's shift of the
burden because of the plaintiff's typical inability to join "all the
parties who were or could have been responsible for the harm
caused."
,104
3. Enterprise Liability.-To avoid the difficulties of apply-
ing concerted action and alternative liability to DES litigation, a
novel synthesis of the two has been proposed. Enterprise liabil-
ity focuses on industrywide conduct, as does concerted action,
but does not require a tacit agreement."0 ' Enterprise liability
also allows the defendant to exculpate itself after the burden has
been shifted to it, as does alternative liability, but, unlike alter-
native liability, does not require that all potential wrongdoers be
joined.106 In essence, enterprise liability borrows from both of
the traditional theories by requiring the plaintiff to satisfy the
following elements:
1) Plaintiff is not at fault for his inability to identify the causa-
tive agent, and such inability is due to the nature of the defen-
dants' conduct.
100. Id. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1313.
101. Id. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1313-14.
102. Id. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1314.
103. See notes 72 & 73 and accompanying text supra.
104. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 602, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
105. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 996-97.
106. Id.
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2) A generically similar defective product was manufactured by
all the defendants.
3) Plaintiff's injury was caused by this product defect.
4) The defendants owed a duty to the class of which plaintiff
was a member.
5) There is clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff's injury
was caused by the product of some one of the defendants. For
example, the joined defendants accounted for a high percent-
age of such defective products on the market at the time of
plaintiff's injury.
6) There existed an insufficient, industrywide standard of
safety as to the manufacture of this product.
7) All defendants were tortfeasors satisfying the requirements
of whichever cause of action is proposed: negligence, warranty,
or strict liability.
Once plaintiff proves these elements, the burden of proof as to
causation shifts to defendants, each of which can exonerate it-
self only by showing, according to the standards of proof al-
ready proposed, that its product could not have been the one
which injured this particular plaintiff. Defendants, of course,
may also attempt to disprove any and all elements of plaintiff's
case. Damages will be apportioned among those defendants
found liable in proportion to their market share.107
Although this novel theory has received much attention in both
commentary and case law, it has yet to be accepted by any
court. Recently, a federal district court labeled it "repugnant to
the most basic tenets of tort law,"'108 because it would "render
every manufacturer an insurer not only of the safety of its own
products, but of all generically similar products made by
others .... ,09
4. Modified Alternate Liability.-Rejection of concerted ac-
tion, alternative liability, and enterprise liability did not, how-
ever, prevent the ever-innovative California Supreme Court
from creating a modified form of alternative liability to obviate
the harshness of leaving DES daughters wholly without rem-
edy." 0 Recognizing the complexity of modem industrial society,
in which "advances in science and technology create fungible
107. Id. at 995.
108. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004, 1017 (D.S.C. 1981).
109. Id.
110. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 598, 610, 607 P.2d at 928, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136, 144.
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goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced
to any specific producer,"111 the court in Sindell v. Abbott Labo-
ratories'12 identified "[tihe most persuasive reason for finding
plaintiff states a cause of action [as] that advanced by Summers:
as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of the injury."""' Like the court in
Ferrigno, the majority in Sindell focused on the industry's con-
duct as playing a significant role in making unavailable proof of
which specific producers marketed drugs used in filling particu-
lar prescriptions.1 4 Moreover, the industry was deemed better
able to bear the cost of consumer injuries, better able to discover
and prevent defects, and better able to warn of harmful ef-
fects-considerations that are particularly important when
drugs are involved, "for the consumer is virtually helpless to
protect himself from serious, sometimes permanent, sometimes
fatal, injuries caused by deleterious drugs.""' 5 Thus, when "all
defendants produced a drug from an identical formula and the
manufacturer of the DES which caused plaintiff's injuries can-
not be identified through no fault of plaintiff, a modification of
Summers is warranted.""
The substance of the Sindell modification measures the
likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the drugs that
allegedly injured the plaintiff by the "percentage which the DES
sold by each of them for the purpose of preventing miscarriage
bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for that
purpose." 171 Using this measure, the injustice of shifting the bur-
den of proof to the defendants to demonstrate they could not
have manufactured the drug that injured the plaintiff "is signifi-
cantly diminished" so long as the plaintiff "joins in the action
the manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES" market.118
The court in Sindell further held that damages would be appor-
tioned among those defendants who did not meet this burden of
proof according to the same market shares that measured the
111. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
112. 26 CaI.3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980).
113. Id. at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
114. Id. at 601, 610-11, 607 P.2d at 930, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
115. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
116. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
117. Id. at 611-12, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
118. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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likelihood of their being the precise causal agent.11" Admitting
that market share and apportionment of damages might be diffi-
cult to calculate, the California Supreme Court observed that
under its approach "each manufacturer's liability would approx-
imate its responsibility for the injuries caused by its own prod-
uct."120 That result is preferable to refusing to adjudicate the
DES plaintiff's claim.
The Sindell modification prompted a flurry of casenotes
and comments, 1  some laudatory and some critical,1 2 but most
agreeing that "market share liability" represented a unique ap-
proach to the DES problem.1 2 3 Upon analysis, however, the
Sindell approach proves to be innovative but not unique. The
innovation simply extends the theory of alternative liability to a
complex problem increasingly characteristic of modem indus-
trial society. The court itself viewed its holding as simply a
"modification" of Summers.
5. Market Share Liability as a Unifying Concept.-Indeed,
"modified alternate liability" more accurately describes the
Sindell holding than does "market share liability"124 -and the
difference is more than semantic. Properly understood, "market
share liability" could be used to describe three of the four meth-
ods that DES plaintiffs invoke to satisfy the cause-in-fact re-
quirement. Although the court in Sindell tied market share lia-
bility to its modification of alternative liability, the seminal
article on DES litigation, while proposing the enterprise liability
synthesis, also stated that under its approach "[d]amages will be
apportioned among those defendants found liable in proportion
to their market shares. 125 Explaining this aspect of her propo-
sal, the author placed market share liability in its proper context
119. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
120. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
121. Recent Developments, 4 AM. J. TRI ADvoc. 492 (1980); Case Note, 16 TULSA
L.J. 286 (1980); Recent Cases, 49 U. CIN. L. Rzv. 926 (1980); Comment, 49 UMKC L.
REv. 245 (1981); Note, 42 U. PA. L. REv. 669 (1981); Note, 59 WASH. U. L.Q. 571 (1981).
122. Compare Recent Cases, 49 U. CiN. L. REv. 926 (1980) and Note, 42 U. PA. L.
Rv. 669 (1981) with Recent Developments, 4 AM. J. TRAL ADvoc. 492 (1980); Case
Note, 16 TULSA L.J. 286 (1980); Comment, 49 UMKC L. REv. 245 (1981) and Note, 59
WASH. U.L.Q. 571 (1981).
123. See, e.g., Recent Developments, 4 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 492 (1980); Case Note,
16 TULSA L.J. 286 (1980); Comment, 49 UMKC L. Rzv. 245 (1981).
124. See Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at _, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
125. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 995.
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by identifying it as a form of comparative contribution:
Much of the strength and justice of enterprise liability rests in
the suggestion that damages be apportioned among defendants
in proportion to their market shares. Since enterprise liability
results in joint and several liability, each defendant is liable for
the whole amount of the damages. Because contribution exists
in the majority of jurisdictions, damages in fact will generally
be divided among the defendants. Unfortunately, only a minor-
ity of jurisdictions recognizes a comparative form of contribu-
tion where the amount of damages each defendant pays is
based on the degree to which each defendant caused plaintiff's
injury, although such contribution is more equitable where the
degree of responsibility among defendants is ascertainably une-
qual. It is suggested that comparative contribution should exist
in enterprise liability .... 126
Interestingly, the only DES case that has gone to judgment
in favor of the plaintiff based on a concerted action theory hails
from New York,127 a jurisdiction that recognizes comparative
contribution by statute.128 That statute apportions comparative
contribution according to "equitable shares" and "relative cul-
pability. '129 Application of these standards to a DES judgment
based on concerted action, which itself focuses on the industry's
conduct in the marketplace, 130 results in yet a third way of arriv-
ing at "market share liability." Since DES was produced and
marketed as a fungible substance, relative fault correlates poorly
with any attributes of the drug specific to any manufacturer; for
the same reasons, equity and relative fault correlate well with
market shares, especially when the gravamen of the legal claim
implicates the conduct of all participants in the market as a
whole.131 In short, Sindell is not unique in proposing that dam-
ages be apportioned among jointly liable defendants according
to their relative market shares. Enterprise liability does the
same thing, and concerted action arrives at the same result in
those jurisdictions that recognize comparative contribution.
Thus, "market share liability" should be viewed as a unify-
126. Id. at 999-1000.
127. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
128. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 1400 (McKinney 1976).
129. Id. § 1402.
130. See notes 82-93 and accompanying text supra.
131. Id. See also FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 978-85, 996-97.
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ing concept rather than as a distinguishing feature of Sindell. As
a unifying concept, market share liability provides the thread
that thematically binds the theories invoked by DES plaintiffs
to avoid dismissal on cause-in-fact grounds. Each of the theories
has merit in light of the facts surrounding the production and
marketing of DES; each can lead to apportionment of damages
based on market shares; each accordingly reflects the sentiments
of Learned Hand, uttered four decades ago: "the single
tortfeasor cannot be allowed to escape through the meshes of a
logical net. He is a wrongdoer; let him unravel the casuistries
resulting from his wrong."1"2 DES plaintiffs should successfully
hurdle the cause-in-fact obstacle in any jurisdiction enlightened
enough to adapt its tort law to "contemporary complex industri-
alized society."13 But even if she successfully negotiates the
cause-in-fact requirement, the DES plaintiff still must confront
the remaining impediments awaiting her in the labyrinth.
C. Standard of Care and Collateral Estoppel
To establish negligent failure to test, the DES daughter
must prove that the drug manufacturers breached their standard
of care. 3 The standard applicable to manufacturers of prescrip-
tion drugs is a standard of expertise, as stated in Krug v. Ster-
ling Drug Co.:
135
[T]he manufacturer and distributor of a prescription drug to
be administered to human beings, as with the manufacturer of
a weed killer or a hair dye, should be "held to the skill of an
expert in that particular business" and "'to an expert's knowl-
edge of the arts, materials and processes,' and is bound to keep
reasonably abreast of scientific knowledge and discoveries con-
cerning his field and, of course, is -deemed to possess whatever
knowledge is thereby imparted." And it follows as a matter of
course that there was no error in the court's ... [i]nstruction
... defining "negligence" as "failure to use the skill of an ex-
pert in the defendant's business."138
132. Navigazione Libera Triestina Societa Anonima v. Newtown Creek Towing Co.,
98 F.2d 694, 697 (2d Cir. 1938), cited in Note, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 926, 935 (1980).
133. Sindell, 26 Cal.3d at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
134. See generally W. PaOSSER, supra note 38, at 143-80.
135. 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967).
136. Id. at 152 (citations omitted).
6851982]
23
Abrahams and Musgrave: The Des Labyrinth
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
To fulfill this standard, the drug manufacturer must do more
than comply with Federal Drug Administration requirements.5 7
It is bound to have knowledge of medical journals warning of
hazardous side effects of drugs it markets." 8
Reading all available data, however, is not sufficient. "The
manufacturer has an obligation to test and inquire to determine
the adverse effects of the drug. . . . A manufacturer can be lia-
ble for the failure to test and secure the information . . . . The
duty to test is commensurate with the potential for harm that
a drug may have."139 This additional obligation to test was char-
acterized by Judge Wisdom as "even more important"' 40 than
the duty to be familiar with available knowledge: "A product
must not be made available to the public without disclosure of
those dangers that the application of reasonable foresight would
reveal. '14' In essence, existing knowledge triggers a duty to gen-
erate additional information.
1. Evidence of Negligent Failure to Test.-These duties
arising from the drug industry's standard of expertise guide the
jury when it balances "the risk, in light of the social value of the
interest threatened, and the probability and extent of the harm,
against the value of the interest which the actor is seeking to
protect, and the expedience of the course pursued.1' 42 Applica-
tion of this formula to the DES context demonstrates the woeful
inadequacy of drug industry precautions. As discussed below, ev-
idence available before the withdrawal of DES from the market
establishes that the drug was not effective in preventing miscar-
riages. The benefits of the drug were minor at best. Evidence
available before DES was sold to pregnant women establishes
that synthetic estrogens like DES were known to be carcinogenic
and that the risks were high. Evidence that tests on mice were
137. See, e.g., Stromstodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 257 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D.N.D.
1966), a/J'd, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969).
138. See Krug, 416 S.W.2d at 143. As articulated by Judge Wisdom in the context of
asbestosis litigation: "status as expert means that at a minimum he must keep abreast of
scientific knowledge, discoveries, and advances, and is presumed to know what is im-
parted thereby." Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S; 869 (1974).
139. Dixon, Drug Product Liability: Information for Safety, 16 TRiAL 62-63 (Nov.
1980) (emphasis added).
140. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089-90.
141. Id. at 1090.
142. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 149.
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common even four decades ago and that such tests when per-
formed confirmed the carcinogenic effects of DES demonstrates
that "the burden of adequate precautions"143 was low. Yet "none
of the companies producing or marketing DES had performed
any tests on the drug's effect on the fetus itself, either in
humans or in animals.
'1 44
In connection with efficacy, "[t]wo medical sources in the
1940's were primarily responsible for the belief that DES would
significantly reduce the incidence of threatened abortions.
'145
Both of these studies were, however, "historical" rather than
"controlled studies, 1 46 and both "were soon criticized for their
lack of adequate controls. 1 47 Later controlled studies did not
substantiate the earlier claims of efficacy.
148
Stilbestrol was synthesized in 1938 and was widely used from
the mid-1940s to 1970 in the United States to prevent
threatened miscarriage, though doubt was cast upon its value
as a therapeutic agent in that situation as early as 1953. A sta-
tistical analysis of available studies in 1958 concluded that
there was no statistical evidence for the value of stilbestrol
therapy in pregnancy, but it continued to be regarded as ap-
propriate treatment in many centers .... 149
n fact, in 1938 Dr. Charles Dodd, who originally synthesized the
drug, published findings indicating DES actually caused rather
than prevented miscarriages.150
Not until 1962, however, did the FDA require proof of effi-
cacy.15 In the late 1960s the FDA reviewed the effectiveness of
drugs it had approved before 1962 and rated them as "effective,"
143. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Learned
Hand, C.J.), cited in W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 149.
144. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
145. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 963 n.2.
146. J. BICHLER, supra note 3, at 134.
147. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 963 n.2; See also Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at
-, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
148. See, e.g., Davis & Fugo, Steroids in the Treatment of Early Pregnancy Com-
plications, 142 J.A.M.A. 778 (1950); Dieckmann, Davis, Pynkiewicz & Pottinger, Does
the Administration of Diethylstilbestrol During Pregnancy Have Therapeutic Value?,
66 AM. J. OBST. & GYN. 1062 (1953); Robinson & Shettles, The Use of Diethylstilbestrol
in Threatened Abortion, 63 Am. J. OBST. & GYN. 1330 (1952).
149. Poskanzer & Herbst, supra note 6, at 1892-93 (emphasis added).
150. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 630.
151. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 966 n.12.
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"probably effective," "possibly effective," or "ineffective. ' 152
DES was rated as "possibly effective," which meant "there is lit-
tle evidence of effectiveness under any of the criteria stated."158
Since 1973 drugs rated "possibly effective" have not been al-
lowed FDA approval.1 5 In short, before withdrawing DES from
the market in 1971, the drug industry knew or should have
known that the drug was not efficacious in preventing accidents
of pregnancy.
The industry before 1971 also knew or should have known
of the carcinogenic effects of DES. "As early as 1959 the FDA
withdrew approval of the use of DES in chicken feed [as a
growth stimulant] on the ground that it was a known carcino-
gen. 1 55 Indeed, knowledge that synthetic estrogens are carcino-
genic was widespread in the 1940s,156 and several studies during
that time specifically questioned whether DES was carcinogenic
and whether it would adversely affect the fetus in utero.1 57
Those fears were not unfounded. In 1939 three physiologists ad-
ministered DES to rats and mice and concluded that the drug
crossed the placenta and had malforming action on the fetus.158
The tests done on mice in 1939 demonstrate that such tests
were available before FDA approval of DES was sought. Today,
of course, animal testing is merely the first of several phases of
testing required for FDA approval. 15 9 Testing on mice is espe-
cially useful in the DES context because of certain crucial simi-
larities between the reproductive physiology of mice and that of
humans.1 0 When controlled testing of mice finally occurred, the
"results. . . clearly demonstrate[d] the association between pre-
natal exposure to DES in mice and subsequent female genital
tract abnormalities, including neoplasia [tumors]. 1 61 In light of
the high risks and questionable benefits associated with DES,
one cannot help wondering why the drug industry failed to carry
152. Id.
153. Id. See also Poskanzer & Herbst, supra note 6, at 1893.
154. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 966 n.12.
155. Id. at 963 n.2.
156. Stafi & Mattingly, supra note 20, at 676.
157. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
158. Id. at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
159. See Dixon, supra note 139, at 64-65.
160. McLachlin, Newbold & Bullock, supra note 6, at 3994.
161. Id. at 3992.
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its "burden of adequate precaution" before marketing DES to
pregnant women between 1947 and 1971.
2. The Collateral Estoppel Strategy.-After hearing evi-
dence of negligent failure to test adequately, the jury in Bichler
v. Eli Lilly & Co. 16 2 returned a general verdict in favor of Joyce
Bichler and answered the following written interrogatories in
support of that verdict:
(1) Was DES reasonably safe in the treatment of accidents of
pregnancy when it was ingested by plaintiff's mother in 1953?
No.
(2) Was DES a proximate cause of plaintiff's cancer?
Yes.
(3) In 1953 when plaintiff's mother ingested DES, should the
defendant, as a reasonably prudent drug manufacturer, have
foreseen that DES might cause cancer in the offspring of preg-
nant women who took it?
Yes.
(4) Foreseeing that DES might cause cancer in the offspring of
pregnant women who took it, would a reasonably prudent drug
manufacturer test it on pregnant mice before marketing it?
Yes.
(5) If DES had been tested on pregnant mice, would the tests
have shown that DES causes cancer in their offspring?
Yes.
(6) Would a reasonably prudent drug manufacturer have mar-
keted DES for use in treating accidents of pregnancy at the
time it was ingested by plaintiff's mother, if it had known that
DES causes cancer in the offspring of pregnant mice?
No.
(7) Did defendant and other drug manufacturers act in concert
with each other in testing and marketing of DES for use in
treating accidents of pregnancy?
Yes. 16 3
Because the chemical structure of DES did not change dur-
ing the time it was marketed to pregnant women,'" questions
(1), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) are identical to inquiries that would
arise in any action based on negligent failure to test. A DES
162. No. 65534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 24, 1980).
163. Id., judgment at 2-6.
164. Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Eli Lilly & Co., question
one, Blanford v. Abbott Laboratories, No. c 80-6445 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
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daughter alleging such negligence may choose to avoid litigating
the standard of care issue by offensively invoking collateral es-
toppel to preclude Eli Lilly from relitigating the six questions
decided against it in Bichler. By seeking a partial summary
judgment165 on these questions, the DES plaintiff strengthens
her litigation posture, shortens her trial, and seeks consistency
in results-while still leaving the issues of proximate cause and
ultimate liability for the jury.
The decision to invoke offensive collateral estoppel is not,
however, as easy as it seems. If Eli Lilly is precluded from reliti-
gating the six questions, then the plaintiff is likewise precluded
from presenting some of her most potent evidence 66 to the jury,
unless, of course, some of that evidence might creep in elsewhere
in the trial. Allowing it to creep in, however, severely com-
promises the efficiency that is touted as one of collateral estop-
pel's advantages.1 67 Moreover, recent commentators have criti-
cized the use of collateral estoppel in products liability cases
concerning mass produced products and nonsimultaneous inju-
ries.168 Courts sympathizing with this criticism may react with
hostility to the plaintiff's use of the doctrine; the result might be
that as much time would be spent debating its application as
would otherwise have been spent in trying the six issues them-
selves. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has up-
held a plaintiff's offensive use of collateral estoppel, e9 and the
trend supports its expansive application in the DES context.
165. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
166. See notes 145-61 and accompanying text supra.
167. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 328 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Labo-
ratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).
168. See, e.g., Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the Man Produced Product: A
Proposal, 15 N. ENG. L. Rsv. 1 (1979). Although Mr. Weinberger's critique repeatedly
suggests its applicability to DES litigation, see id. at 1 n.2, 22 n.112, 46 n.192, not one of
his examples nor the reasoning accompanying them confronts a DES claim based on
negligent failure to test. Indeed, none of his specific examples of his distinction between
"intrinsic" and "extrinsic" design defects, see id. at 39-41, 52-54, and none of his reason-
ing in connection with his analysis of the quadrigen cases, see id. at 42-52, even contem-
plates the existence of failure to test as a distinguishable theory of recovery.
Compare Wilner, Can An Industry Be Collaterally Estopped From Litigating Prod-
uct Liability Issues?, 4 J. PROD. LiAB. 189 (1981) (opposes use of offensive collateral es-
toppel in products liability cases) with Kroll, Principles of Collateral Estoppel in Prod-
ucts Liability, 677 INS. L.J. 313, 327 (June 1979) (approves of use of offensive collateral
estoppel: "for once it appears that the tail is not wagging the tiger").
169. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 332-33.
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Four threshold requirements determine the applicability of
collateral estoppel. First, the issue to be concluded must be
identical to that involved in the prior action; second, the issue
must have been actually litigated in the prior action; third, the
issue must have been litigated against the party or one in privity
with the party against whom the doctrine is invoked; and finally,
the determination of the issue in the prior action must have
been necessary to the resulting judgment.170 All requirements
are met when a DES plaintiff seeks to invoke Bichler against Eli
Lilly: the six issues, as we have seen, are identical in both cases,
Eli Lilly fully litigated them during the thirty-five days of trial
and subsequent appeal in Bichler;1' 7 and each was necessary to
the jury's general verdict against the drug company in that case.
The plaintiff need show nothing else to invoke the doctrine of
collateral estoppel.
The former rule of mutuality, which required both parties
in a present action to have been parties to or in privity with a
party to the prior judgment before estoppel could be used to
foreclose subsequent litigation on an issue, has been discarded
by the Supreme Court.7 2 The Court first abandoned the mutu-
ality requirement in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. University
of Illinois Foundation, 1 7  when it asked "whether it is any
longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair
opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue"174 and an-
swered negatively in the context of defensive collateral estop-
pel. 7 5 Eight years later the Court relied heavily on its reasoning
in Blonder-Tongue when it upheld offensive collateral estoppel.
In Parklane Hosiery v. Shore,1 7 6 the district court had re-
fused to apply collateral estoppel offensively because it would
deny the defendants their seventh amendment right to a jury
trial. 17 7 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a party who
170. Lucas v. Velikanje, 2 Wash. App. 888, 894, 471 P.2d 103, 107 (1970).
171. Bichler, No. 65534, judgment at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 24, 1980).
172. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 327; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, 402 U.S. at 327-29.
173. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
174. Id. at 328.
175. Id. at 329 (citations omitted). The Court emphasized that "the requirement of
determining whether the party against whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate is a most significant safeguard" to assure that the issue was actu-
ally litigated in the prior suit. Id.
176. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
177. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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has had issues of fact determined against it after a full and fair
opportunity to litigate in a bench trial is collaterally estopped
from obtaining a subsequent jury trial of these same issues of
fact. 17 The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's deci-
sion and concluded that the preferable approach is not to pre-
clude the use of offensive collateral estoppel but to grant trial
courts discretion to determine its applicability.
179
The Supreme Court's more recent treatments of collateral
estoppel support the expanded use of the doctrine. In late 1980
the Court summarized the trend and added the following:
Indeed, though the federal courts may look to the common law
or to the policies supporting res judicata and collateral estop-
pel in assessing the preclusive effect of decisions of other fed-
eral courts, Congress has specifically required all federal courts
to give preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the
courts of the State from which the judgments emerged would
do so:
"The... judicial proceedings of any court of any State
... shall have the same full faith and credit in every
court within the United States and its Territories and
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State ... ,,18o
The Court's reference to full faith and credit concepts, twice in
the same passage,"' may in fact reveal a constitutional basis for
the expanding use of collateral estoppel: rather than being pre-
cluded from utilizing the doctrine, trial courts may find their
discretion shrinking as they are compelled to use it in satisfac-
tion of the requirements of full faith and credit.8 '
This trend toward expanded use of collateral estoppel has
been followed in products liability cases involving mass-pro-
duced products and nonsimultaneous injuries-cases exemplified
by DES and asbestosis litigation. In Flatt v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.,1 83 the plaintiff sought to preclude relitigation of the
issue of whether products containing asbestos are unreasonably
178. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery, 565 F.2d 815, 819 (2d Cir. 1977).
179. 439 U.S. at 331.
180. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980) (citations omitted).
181. Id.
182. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
183. 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980).
692 [Vol. 33
30
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [1982], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss4/5
1982] THE DES LABYRINTH 693
dangerous and defective. The plaintiff moved for partial sum-
mary judgment against not only Johns-Manville, who had lost
on that issue in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,""
but also against defendant Certain-Teed, who had never been a
party to an adverse judgment in an asbestosis case. The court in
Flatt granted the motion against both:
Defendants Johns-Manville and Certain-Teed are pre-
cluded from relitigating the issue of whether their asbestos
products which were manufactured by each of said defendants
were defective and unreasonably dangerous, under the provi-
sions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). The Court
directs that each defendant be collaterally estopped from rais-
ing said issue in the course of this trial.
The Court finds as a matter of law that products placed in
the stream of commerce containing asbestos are defective for
the reason that the same are unreasonably dangerous to the
users of such products. Borel, supra. The Court holds as a mat-
ter of law that asbestos dust is a competent producing cause of
certain lung diseases, including asbestosis and mesothelioma.185
Even stronger are the reasons for collaterally estopping Eli
Lilly, the drug industry's leader in DES development and sales,
184. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
185. 488 F. Supp. at 841. Whether Certain-Teed was precluded from relitigation of
the issue by operation of collateral estoppel or stare decisis or both is unclear from this
quote. The court expressly included "each defendant" in its collateral estoppel holding,
even though that inclusion with respect to Certain-Teed patently violates the require-
ment that the party being estopped had to be a party to the prior suit. Recently the
Fifth Circuit in an astonishingly analogous case, Migues v. Fibreboard Corp., 662 F.2d
1182 (5th Cir. 1981), interpreted Flatt to preclude Johns-Manville from relitigation on
the basis of collateral estoppel, while correctly observing that Certain-Teed could only be
precluded on the basis of stare decisis. See id. at 1186-87. The appellate panel in Migues
then expressly declined to review the collateral estoppel issue because it was not squarely
"presented in the case before us," id. at 1185, but proceeded to hold that Borel did not
establish that asbestos products are unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. Id. at
1187-89. Instead, Borel merely held that the jury possessed sufficient evidence to find for
the plaintiff. Id. at 1189. Thus Migues effectively overturns Flatt's reasoning with re-
spect to Certain-Teed while leaving its collateral estoppel holding against Johns-
Manville intact. The Fifth Circuit's analysis correctly distinguishes between the issues,
reaches an appropriate result, and is thoroughly consistent with the approach of this
article-even to the point of subtly recognizing the possible propriety for greatly ex-
panding collateral estoppel in other cases: "we do note that the juggernaut of modern
technology has repeatedly given rise to new concepts in our torts jurisprudence and pro-
cedure." Id. at 1189. See also Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353
(E.D. Tex. 1981).
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from relitigating the issues decided against it in Bichler. Eli
Lilly has been named as a defendant in virtually every lawsuit
involving DES, so the difficulties addressed by Flatt's holding
with respect to Certain-Teed do not arise. Moreover, because the
composition of DES did not vary during the time it was sold to
pregnant women, 186 all DES cases involve identical products and
therefore identical issues. Most importantly, the specificity of
the written interrogatories in Bichler leaves no question about
whether the identical issues were actually litigated and resulted
in the verdict in that case.
18 7
Yet in the first reported decision in which a DES plaintiff
sought to rely on Bichler while invoking collateral estoppel, a
new twist was added to the serpentine path. Katz v. Eli Lilly &
Co. 88 held that Eli Lilly could depose two of the Bichier jurors
in order to demonstrate that Bichler was based on a compromise
verdict that should not be given collateral estoppel effect.18 9 Al-
though one commentator has extolled the virtues of the Katz
holding,190 three criticisms may be leveled against it. First, as
another commentator has noted, Katz violates "the long-estab-
lished Mansfield rule which prohibits a juror from impeaching
his verdict."" '
Second, as the same critic observed, 192 Katz inadequately
distinguished 9 3 Professor Moore's assertion:
A judgment on a compromise verdict, like any other erroneous
186. Plaintiff's Third Set of Interrogatories to Defendant Eli Lilly & Co., question
one, Blanford v. Abbott Laboratories, No. c 80-6445 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
187. See generally Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 634-36. The affirmance
of Bichler on appeal against a panoply of asserted errors, see id. at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at
634-36, greatly enhanced one DES user's ability to negotiate the legal labyrinth success-
fully. See J. BICHLER, supra note 3, at 188. She does, however, face her decisive test in
the New York Court of Appeals. See DES Users, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 15, 1982, at 19, col. 4.
188. 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
189. Id. at 381-82. The court in Katz, relying on the requirement that a party must
have a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue before it can be collaterally estopped,
reasoned that "fundamental notions of fairness require that Lilly be afforded every rea-
sonable opportunity to explore the factual basis for" its claim that Bichler was based on
a compromise verdict, especially since the person invoking collateral estoppel was a
stranger to the first suit and the depositions could not affect the finality of that first suit.
Id.
190. See Weinberger, supra note 168, at 22 n.112, 46 n.192.
191. Note, 12 J. MAR. L. REv. 201, 207 (1980).
192. Id. at 217-18.
193. Katz, 84 F.R.D. at 382.
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judgment, can be corrected in the trial court, or upon appeal.
Collateral estoppel is by judgment, not by verdict; and a final
judgment, though erroneous, is an adjudication entitled to col-
lateral estoppel effect.
194
Indeed, on appeal of the Bichler verdict, the New York Supreme
Court considered and rejected Eli Lilly's claim that the verdict
was compromised. It explained that the trial court did not err in
refusing the defendant's motion for a noncompromise verdict
charge because the general verdict proved to be unanimous, the
defendant failed to poll the jury to clarify its answers to the spe-
cial interrogatories, and New York's civil practice rules authorize
less than unanimous action by a jury with respect to such inter-
rogatories.195 Eli Lilly should no more be able to relitigate its
claim that the verdict in Bichler was compromised than it
should be able to relitigate the answers to the special
interrogatories.
Finally, competent evidence of a genuine compromise ver-
dict is tenuous. Eli Lilly was forced to seek depositions of mem-
bers of the Bichler jury because of their apparent unwillingness
to sign affidavits indicating that one juror conditioned her vote
for liability on the understanding that the award of damages
would be reduced by averaging the amounts thought proper by
each juror."9 8 Accordingly, Eli Lilly's effort to depose the jurors
should be evaluated for exactly what it is: a defendant's attempt
to use a hearsay account of conversations with the jurors to
soften the impact of a dangerous precedent against it.197 Fur-
thermore, the averaging of individual jurors' awards to arrive at
a final figure does not necessarily establish that the verdict was
compromised in the legal sense. 198
194. 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.443[4], at 3917 (2d ed. 1980).
195. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at -, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (citations omitted).
196. Katz, 84 F.R.D. at 380.
197. Compare id. with Note, 12 J. MAR. L. REv. 201, 206 n.25 (1980).
198. "'A compromise verdict is one reached only by surrender of conscientious con-
victions on one material issue by some jurors in return for a similar relinquishment of
matters in their opinion on another issue. The result is a verdict which does not have the
full support of the entire jury.'" Note, 12 J. MAR. L. REV. 201, 206 n.24 (1980) (quoting
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 260 (5th ed. 1979). "Quotient verdicts" indeed represent one
type of compromise verdict, see 6A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 194,
59.08[4], at 59-128, but the line between inappropriate averagings that constitute such
verdicts and acceptable jury conduct is often a fine line:
While it may be accepted as settled that a verdict rendered in pursuance of an
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Ironically, the ultimate test of Katz on appeal will never oc-
cur because, after securing the ability to depose Bichler's jurors,
Eli Lilly settled the Katz case for $235,000.199 Given the three
criticisms of Katz, DES daughters should be able to use the
jury's answers to the special interrogatories from Bichler for col-
lateral estoppel purposes.
The specificity of these interrogatories makes their availa-
bility for collateral estoppel use especially alluring. The DES
plaintiff accordingly must choose between two strategies that
will enable her to show a breach of the standard of care. She
may present and rely on the evidence of the industry's negligent
failure to test DES,200 or she may offensively invoke collateral
estoppel. Both strategies should prove successful and enable her
to proceed through the labyrinth to the next issue-legal cause.
D. Legal Cause and Statistical Association
Vaginal cancer is rare in women over the age of fifty years
and was practically unknown in young women until the late
1960s.201 Only three cases of clear cell adenocarcinoma of the va-
gina in young women were reported before 1966.202 Between
1966 and 1969, however, eight girls between the ages of fifteen
and twenty-two were treated for the disease in Boston.203
Given the rarity of this disease and the unusual number of
young women with similar symptoms, an epidemiological case
agreement by the jurors to accept one-twelfth of the aggregate amount of their
several estimates, without the assent of their judgment to such a sum as their
verdict, is invalid, yet it is equally well settled that, although jurors divide the
aggregate of their several estimates by 12, and return the quotient as their
verdict, it will not be held to be legally objectionable if, after the amount has
been ascertained, the respective jurors deliberately assent to and accept the
amount so obtained as, in their opinion, a just verdict, and so return it. The
essential ingredient of a 'quotient' verdict which renders it objectionable in the
eye of the law is that there should be an antecedent agreement between the
jurors to accept the result of the division without hesitatation as the proper
and true verdict to be rendered.
Consolidated Ice-Mach. Co. v. Trenton Hygeian Ice Co., 57 F. 898, 899 (C.C.D.N.J.
1893), quoted in 6A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 194, 1 59.08[4], at 59-128
n.16.
199. Note, 12 J. MAR. L. REV. 201, 224 n.120 (1980).
200. See notes 144-161 and accompanying text supra.
201. Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra note 6, at 878.
202. Ulfelder, supra note 6, at 428.
203. Herbst, Ulfelder, & Poskanzer, supra note 6, at 878.
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study was conducted to uncover facts that might be associated
with the sudden appearance of these tumors.0 4 The result of the
study demonstrated a "highly significant association between
the treatment of mothers with estrogen diethylstilbestrol during
pregnancy and the subsequent development of adenocarcinoma
of the vagina in their daughters (p less than 0.00001). "205 This
association has been confirmed in subsequent studies.20 6
The number of women who took DES will never be known,
but estimates indicate that up to three million took it during
pregnancies. 207 Fortunately, the risk of clear cell adenocarcinoma
developing in their exposed offspring appears to be small.208 Es-
timates range from a high of one in 250 to a low of one in
10,000.209 Before the DES-cancer connection is dismissed as ex-
tremely rare, however, it must be compared with the occurrence
of clear cell adenocarcinoma among young women not exposed
to DES in utero:
Among girls whose mothers were given stilbestrol during preg-
nancy, the cumulative incidence of vaginal adenocarcinoma to
age 25 is somewhere between 1/1000 and 1/10,000. Let's as-
sume the minimum incidence of 1/10,000. In non-exposed girls,
the maximum incidence is 1/1,000,000. The difference in the
rates (1/10,000-1/1,000,000) is .99/10,000, or 99% of the inci-
dence in the exposed group. This figure, called the attributable
risk percent in epidemiologic parlance, can be interpreted as
the likelihood that the vaginal adenocarcinoma involved stil-
bestrol as a cause in this instance. Clearly, it is very likely
(99%) that stilbestrol was involved. 210
In other words, the risk of vaginal adenocarcinoma is one hun-
dred times greater among women exposed to DES in utero. In
addition, the vast majority of these women suffer other abnor-
204. Poskanzer & Herbst, supra note 6, at 1892. The study referred to is reported in
Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra note 6.
205. Herbst, Ulfelder, & Poskanzer, supra note 6, at 879.
206. See, e.g., Greenwald, Barlow, Nasca & Burnett, supra note 6; Nordquist, Fidler,
Woodruff & Lewis, Clear Cell Adenocarcinoma of the Cervix and Vagina, 37 CANCER
858 (1976).
207. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 965 n.6.
208. See Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer, supra note 6, at 880.
209. FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 965 n.7.
210. Letter from Dr. Noel S. Weiss, Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, Seat-
tle, Wash., to James P. Moceri (Mar. 31, 1981) (on file with authors).
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malities, the most common of which is the possibly precancerous
condition called adenosis.21'
Statistics cannot demonstrate a cause and effect relation-
ship, but they demonstrate the close association between the ex-
posure in utero to DES and the subsequent development of
clear cell adenocarcinoma.
In an absolute sense, the causation of cancer could only be es-
tablished through an understanding of the scientific mecha-
nism whereby the introduction of a substance into the body
creates a tumor. This is not understood in the case of DES.
Neither is it understood in any instance of environmentally
caused cancer.
212
Doctors are, however, able to observe the effects of DES on a
woman's body. DES is a synthetic estrogen. 13 Its effects on the
body are caused only if the hormone is capable of binding to a
specific protein macromolecule within the cell called a recep-
tor. 14 The only chemicals that will mimic the action of a partic-
ular hormone are those that will bind to a receptor. Conversely,
the only tissues that respond to hormonal stimulation are those
that contain the receptor. These tissues are called target tis-
sues.2 15 Estrogens have many target tissues. These include struc-
tures in the genital tract, the mammary gland, liver, kidney, pi-
tuitary gland, brain, and others.1 6
The biochemical effects of DES on human fetal genital tis-
sues are not fully understood because of the obvious restrictions
placed upon scientific research on humans.21 7 Scientists know,
however, that estrogens stimulate the mullerian duct tissue,
which is the embryonic origin of the vagina:
211. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 968; Herbst, Ulfelder & Poskanzer,
supra note 6, at 880.
212. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 965 n.5.
213. Greenwald, Barlow, Nasca & Burnett, supra note 6, at 391.
214. See Munck, General Aspects of Steroid Hormone-Receptor Interactions, in
RECEPTORS AND MECHANISMS OF ACTION OF STEROID HORMONES 2-3 (J.R. Pasqualini, ed.
1976). The principles governing such biochemical binding apply to both steroid and non-
steroid hormones. Stump & Sar, Autoradiographic Localization of Estrogen, Androgen,
Progestin and Blucocortico-steroid in "Target Tissues" and "Nontarget Tissues," in
RECEPTORS AND MECHANISMS OF ACTION OF STEROID HORMONES 42 (J.R. Pasqualini, ed.
1976).
215. See generally Munck, supra note 214, at 2-5.
216. Stump & Sar, supra note 214, at 43-44.
217. See generally P. RAMSEY, ETHICS OF FETAL RESEARCH chs. 6-7 (1975).
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Although it is also agreed that the vagina has an ancestry
in both mullerian duct and urogenital sinus tissues, the exact
contribution of each is not clear nor is the mechanism by which
prenatal exposure to DES distorts the developing vagina and
the embryonic mullerian epithelium develops into tumor ....
... After the mullerian ducts extend caudally during
early fetal life to the level of the future hymen, they fuse and
form a muscular scaffold on which the squamous cells, which
derive from the urogenital sinus, invade from below, replacing
completely the mullerian mucosa up to the level of the external
os of the cervical canal. Since this entire process begins some-
time after the fourth or fifth week of intrauterine life and it is
not complete until sometime after the 20th week of pregnancy,
it is possible that DES may act to inhibit the replacement of
the mullerian epithelium by squamous epithelium or, possibly,
to stimulate the persistance of the mullerian epithelium in the
vagina. The residual mullerian epithelium results in adenosis
and may give rise to clear-cell adenocarcinoma. If the sur-
rounding mesodermal stroma from which the muscular walls of
the vagina, cervix, and uterus derive is affected, one might also
expect to see the ridges, partial strictures, obliterations, fish-
mouth deformities of the cervix, and uterine abnormalities that
have been described in the DES-exposed female.218
Such abnormalities of the vagina and cervix are present and ob-
servable in 75% to 97% of all women exposed to DES in utero
during the first four months of gestation.31' These are the facts
that bear on the question of legal cause.
Legal cause involves "a question of whether the policy of
the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the con-
sequences which have in fact occurred.""10 The basic limitation
on liability for creation of risk arises in connection with this pol-
icy question; this limitation "is to foreseeable consequences." 1'
Because the gist of the plaintiff's action is negligent failure to
test, the question becomes whether drug manufacturers should
foresee unintended consequences from their drugs and respond
by testing to confirm or deny those consequences. "[W]ith every
218. Robboy, Prat & Welch, Vaginal and Cervical Pathology Associated with Pre-
natal Exposure to Diethylstilbestrol, in ESTROGENS AND CANCERS 171-72 (Silverberg &
Majors, eds. 1978).
219. Poskanzer & Herbst, supra note 6, at 1894.
220. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 244.
221. Id. at 251.
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drug there is some good news and some bad news. The good
news is that the drug can cure you; the bad news is that the drug
is a poison." '222 In other words, because drugs are "foreign sub-
stances,' 223 the manufacturer has a duty, as we have seen,12 "to
test and inquire to determine the adverse effects of the drug. 21m 5
Thus unintended consequences are foreseeable in the absence of
tests; if even the most rudimentary tests on mice had been per-
formed, the unintended, adverse consequences of using DES in
pregnancy would have been confirmed. 226 For the DES plaintiff,
foreseeability should not be a significant difficulty.
Instead, her problem involves demonstrating causation by
expert testimony and statistical associations rather than by the
observable cause-and-effect that "causation" connotes. Upon
recognition that "proximate cause" itself is an "unfortunate
2 1 7
misnomer, that demonstration becomes easier:
The plaintiff is not, however, required to prove his case beyond
a reasonable doubt. He need not negative entirely the possibil-
ity that the defendant's conduct was not a cause, and it is
enough that he introduces evidence from which reasonable
men may conclude that it is more probable that the event was
caused by the defendant than that it was not. The fact of cau-
sation is incapable of mathematical proof, since no man can
say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if the
defendant had acted otherwise. Proof of what we call the rela-
tion of cause and effect, that of necessary antecedent and inev-
itable consequence, can be nothing more than "the projection
of our habit of expecting certain consequents to follow certain
antecedents merely because we had observed these sequences,
on previous occasions." If as a matter of ordinary experience a
particular act or omission might be expected, under the cir-
cumstances, to produce a particular result, and that result in
fact has followed, the conclusion may be permissible that the
causal relation exists.
228
222. Dixon, supra note 139, at 62.
223. Id. at 63.
224. See Part II.C. supra.
225. Dixon, supra note 139, at 62.
226. See text accompanying note 158 supra. See also Dunn & Green, supra note 6;
McLachlan, Newbold & Bullock, supra note 6.
227. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 244.
228. Id. at 242.
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Thus, a DES plaintiff must convince a jury that the drug
her mother ingested nearly twenty years ago more probably than
not caused her cancer. Evidence of ordinary experience or com-
mon knowledge is not available, because the basis for finding the
causal sequence lies deep within circumstantial evidence and ex-
pert testimony.229 Such evidence and testimony are, however,
perfectly appropriate, 230 and they explain the biochemical reac-
tions her body experienced because of the drug. The evidence
also demonstrates the alarmingly high statistical correlation be-
tween maternal ingestion of DES and the subsequent develop-
ment of cancer in female offspring. From this evidence, together
with the DES studies done on mice and the extreme rarity of the
disease before the marketing of DES, "reasonable men may con-
clude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the
defendant than that it was not.
' 231
E. Remedies and Restitution
If the DES plaintiff successfully establishes the liability of
drug companies for negligent failure to test as the cause of her
injuries, then she should be entitled to damages calculated in a
manner consistent with those generally awarded in other prod-
ucts liability cases. At least one court, however, has character-
ized the damages calculation differently:
In contrast to other pharmaceutical product liability cases in-
volving prenatal injuries, such as the thalidomide cases, the
damages comparison is rather elusive. With thalidomide, the
damages attributable to the drug would be measured by com-
paring the condition of the plaintiff with the drug-induced de-
fects to his condition had his mother not been prescribed the
drug-which, presumably, would be normality. But, with DES,
the damages attributable to the drug would be measured by
comparing the condition of the plaintiff with the drug-induced
carcinoma to her presumed condition had her mother not been
prescribed the drug-which, ironically, could be nonexistence,
since the drug was prescribed to decrease the incidence of
spontaneous abortions in high-risk mothers. Nonetheless, the
conceptual difficulties suggested by what is, admittedly, a
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
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somewhat artificial and speculative analysis have forestalled
neither the measurement nor cognition of damages in these
cases. 2
32
Application of this reasoning in a negligent failure to test con-
text would, however, inappropriately distort the damages calcu-
lation by ignoring the very basis for liability in such a case.
As Bichler demonstrates, liability for negligent failure to
test is premised on unsubstantiated claims of efficacy being out-
weighed by evidence of known risks.233 Because lack of effective-
ness is crucial to a finding of liability under this theory, any
damages calculation that presumes the plaintiff's condition had
her mother not taken DES would "ironically . . . be nonexis-
tence" inconsistently shields the defendants with a presumption
of efficacy that already has been rejected by the jury's finding of
liability. Accordingly, the damages calculation should disregard
the argument that the DES daughter might not even be alive
were it not for the drug.
Having removed this specious argument from the calculus,
the jury should be instructed to find damages as in other routine
products liability cases. The number of women who may be enti-
tled to such damages,234 however, multiplied by either the
amount awarded to Joyce Bichler by her jury235 or even by the
amount of a typical settlement offer23 6 equals an astounding to-
tal amount of potential liability for the drug industry.2 7 This
232. Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 544 n.12 (D.S.C. 1980).
233. See Part II.C. supra.
234. Estimates of the number of DES daughters range from one-half to three mil-
lion. See FORDHAM Comment, supra note 2, at 965 n.6 and accompanying text. Because
so little was known about the incidence of clear cell adenocarcinoma of the vagina and
cervix among such young women, a registry was established in 1971 to study the DES
phenomena. See Poskanzer & Herbst, supra note 6, at 1893. By January 1980 approxi-
mately 400 cases had been recorded. See The State (Columbia, S.C.), Dec. 6, 1981, at 4E,
col. 1. See also Herbst, Robboy, Scully & Poskanzer, Clear-Cell Adenocarcinoma of the
Vagina and Cervix in Girls: Analysis of 170 Registry Cases, 119 AM. J. OBST. & GYN. 713
(1974); Herbst, Kurman, Scully & Poskanzer, supra note 20.
235. Joyce Bichler was awarded $500,000. See Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at _, 436
N.Y.S.2d at 628; J. BICHLER, supra note 3, at 181.
236. Katz was settled for approximately $235,000. See Note, 12 J. MAR. L. REv. 201,
224 n.120 (1980). Offers of settlement for $100,000 were made to Joyce Bichler twice
during her trial. See J. BICHLER, supra note 3, at 160-61, 177-78.
237. "'It has been estimated that Lilly is a defendant in about three-quarters of the
more than 500 DES actions filed nationwide.'" Note, 12 J. MAR. L. REV. 201, 206 n.26
(1980) (quoting NATL L.J., Dec. 17, 1979, at 5, col. 1). If each of these actions is settled
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exposure has alarmed some commentators who advocate a legis-
latively established trust fund as a substitute for traditional tort
damages:
One alternative proposed would be a system for "latent techno-
logical injury compensation." This system would be a govern-
mental branch which would get the necessary operational
funds through a tax on manufacturers' gross sales. The fund
would be available to both plaintiffs who could identify the
manufacturer and those who could not. Under this system, the
statute of limitations would start to run from the date of
purchase. Once the statute has run, tort litigation would no
longer be an option. The plaintiff would have to apply to an
administrative agency to get relief. Recovery would be based
on the plaintiff's ability to show that he was injured, that the
injury could be traced to a type of product, and that the injury
could not have been discovered prior to the running of the
statute. The plaintiff could recover damages for bodily injury
and lost earnings according to a fixed scale. Pain and suffering
would not be compensable. The government agency though
would be allowed to seek indemnity from the manufacturer on
the basis of fault.
This alternative would more readily satisfy the current so-
cietal concern for compensating victims without doing violence
to traditional tort law. It also provides a solution to a problem
which will occur with increasing frequency as increased tech-
nology leads to injuries which require, and, deserve compensa-
tion. In addition, the goal of loss spreading is served, especially
since the loss is spread among those whose activity generated
the harm.
238
Even proponents of such a system, however, recognize its
shortcomings: prevailing public opinion opposes the creation of
new administrative agencies; manufacturers would resist the im-
position of a new tax; and plaintiffs would resent the limitations
placed on their ability to recover traditional damages. 239 Addi-
tional persuasive reasons counseling against the legislative trust
fund solution include the questionable constitutionality of the
for merely $100,000, see note 236 supra, then a conservative estimate of total liability
could easily exceed fifty million dollars.
238. Comment, Manufacturer's Liability Based on a Market Share Theory, supra
note 6, at 303-04.
239. Id. at 304-05.
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date-of-sale statute of limitation embodied in the scheme 4 0 and
the failure to demonstrate why DES daughters should be singled
out for deprivation of damages for pain and suffering as well as
punitive damages. While Dean Prosser questions the propriety
of imposing punitive damages in "mass disaster" cases,241 no
such question exists with respect to pain and suffering. The in-
tensely personal nature of the injuries and the consequences of
corrective surgery combine to make pain and suffering a signifi-
cant component of the damages calculation.2 2 The cost of medi-
cal attention and loss of earnings pale in comparison with the
loss of one's ability to procreate-an ability deemed to be a fun-
damental substantive right by the United States Supreme
Court.2" 3
The DES plaintiff's ability to recover traditional damages
may be hampered, as we have seen, by the court's misapprehen-
sion of the basis of her theory of recovery. Her reliance on the
legislative process to formulate a tax-funded mechanism for
compensating "latent technological injuries" would be even more
misplaced, once we recall the legislature's treatment of products
liability plaintiffs generally in connection with the trend toward
date-of-sale statutes of limitation. 4 A different solution is
needed.
The proper solution to the problem of remedying the harms
caused by DES may lie in the application of principles governing
restitution. "Restitution based on unjust enrichment cuts across
many branches of the law, including contract, tort and fiduciary
relationship, but it also occupies much territory that is its sole
preserve.'245 Restitution in the tort realm has been applied to
remedy wrongs involving property, such as conversion, infringe-
ment on intellectual property, and misappropriation of trade
secrets,46 as well as wrongs involving personal harms, such as
240. See Part II.A. supra. The resolution of the constitutional questions associated
with date-of-sale statutes of limitation admittedly may differ, however, in the trust fund
context because the proposal contemplates a substitution of means of recovery rather
than a total extinguishment of one's ability to recover.
241. W. PROSSER, supra note 38, at 13.
242. See J. BICHLER, supra note 3, at 70, 128-29, 152-53.
243. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
244. See Part II.A. supra.
245. 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsTrruTON § 1.1, at 2 (1978).
246. See Douthwaite, The Tortfeasor's Profits-A Brief Survey, 19 HASTINrs L.J.
1071, 1077-84 (1968).
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homicide, libel, and invasion of privacy.2 47 Although application
of restitution to personal injuries in the products liability area
might seem a novel expansion of the concept, the law governing
restitution is a law of innovation:
Unjust enrichment is an indefinable idea in the same way that
justice is indefinable. But many of the meanings of justice are
derived from a sense of injustice, and this is true of restitution
since attention is centered on the prevention of injustice. Not
all injustice but rather one special variety: the unjust enrich-
ment of one person at the expense of another. This wide and
imprecise idea has played a creative role in the development of
an important branch of modern law.
24 8
So desirable is the inculcation of restitution's creativity that
the leading treatise declares: "It would be a major advance if
courts, having identified an enrichment felt to be unjust, were
free to choose the form of relief that seems fairest and most ap-
propriate to the circumstances. This is the largely hidden ten-
dency of modern decisions .... -249 Echoing these sentiments,
one survey of restitution's ability to disgorge the tortfeasor's
profits has concluded:
Enough has been said to indicate that a court, once it has the
equitable powers formerly exercisable by the ancient courts of
chancery can, if it so chooses, decree that any tortfeasor,
fiduciary or not, disgorge his profits. Objection has sometimes
been made that there can be no constructive trust without a
trust res, an identifiable subject matter to which the defendant
has legal title .... But the courts have long overlooked this
academic difficulty. The "trust" is nothing more than an anal-
ogy, a device employed by equity to compel restitution.2'
Indeed, the invocation of a "constructive trust is accepted as a
technique to be used in working out solutions to problems of
unjust enrichment; a technique, as one court said, that 'is lim-
ited only by the inventiveness of men who find new ways to en-
rich themselves unjustly by grasping that which does not belong
to them.' -251
247. See id. at 1084-86.
248. G. PALMER, supra note 245, § 1.1, at 5.
249. Id. § 1.1, at 4 (emphasis in original).
250. Douthwaite, supra note 246, at 1074.
251. G. PALMER, supra note 245, § 1.4, at 17.
1982] 705
43
Abrahams and Musgrave: The Des Labyrinth
Published by Scholar Commons, 1982
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In short, restitution could respond to both the problems of
assessing individual damages and the unresponsiveness of the
legislative process. By focusing on profits unjustly enriching the
drug industry from the sale of an unsafe, nonefficacious, un-
tested drug, the focus shifts from discrete individual harms to
mechanisms already within the courts' competence for remedy-
ing mass injuries. A number of specific benefits flow from this
method of remedying the harms caused by DES. From the plain-
tiffs' standpoint, "[tihe availability of restitution is not depen-
dent upon inadequacy of the alternative remedy."252 From the
defendants' standpoint, restitution represents, as Lord Mans-
field observed, "the most favourable way in which he can be
sued: he can be liable no further than the money he has re-
ceived .... ,,25s And from the courts' standpoint, the search for
a "figure" representing compensation leads not to speculation
concerning the worth of the plaintiff's various injuries but in-
stead to the world of facts and figures: the financial records of
an oligopolistic industry2 " whose profits were inflated by the
sale of DES to pregnant women between 1947 and 1971. The
market share figures that the court may have already used in
connection with the cause-in-fact hurdle255 accordingly take on
additional significance in the remedial context, for they may
provide the basis for constructing a fund against which DES
plaintiffs may claim.
The success of such an approach depends, of course, on a
number of variables, including the availability of class action
mechanisms 256 and multidistrict litigation techniques. But DES
cases represent precisely the sort of circumstances susceptible to
such techniques. Owen Fiss, the respected Yale law professor,
has argued that courts should not shy away from the task of
"structural reform" in the context of constitutional cases involv-
252. Id. § 1.6, at 33.
253. Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K. B. 1760), quoted in R.
LEAVELL, J. Lov & G. NELSON, EQUITABLE REMEDES & RESTUrIoN 498 (3d ed. 1980).
254. Recall that Eli Lilly and five or six other manufacturers accounted for an esti-
mated 90% of the DES market. FoamHwm Comment, supra note 2, at 977. See generally
id. at 975-78 (discussion of industry's high profits, high returns, and monopoly pricing
patterns).
255. See Part HB. supra.
256. See generally FED. R. Cirv. P. 23; Note, Diethylstilbestrol: Extension of Federal
Class Action Procedures to Generic Drug Litigation, supra note 6; FORDHAM Comment,
supra note 2, at 968-70 n.22.
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ing complex public institutions.25' His argument is premised on
the assertion that courts do more than merely resolve disputes:
"Adjudication is the social process by which judges give meaning
to our public values.12 5  Professor Fiss' arguments apply with
equal force in the DES context. The DES daughter who success-
fully reaches the exit from the maze should not be forced to
speculate on the worth of her body. Restitution in the hands of a
creative judiciary may respond to some of the problems of con-
structing a proper remedy in the DES context. In that regard,
the words of Lord Mansfield in the seminal case of Moses v.
Macferlan25 bear repeating: "In one word, the gist of this kind
of action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the
case, is obliged by the ties of natural justice and equity to refund
the money.
'260
HI. CONCLUSION
The DES plaintiff, victorious or not, must pause to contem-
plate her experience. She has invoked the processes of litigation
for the resolution of an intensely personal, individual dispute.
Isn't that what she is supposed to do? Aren't courts the proper
forums for individualized dispute-resolution, while legislatures
are the places to go for broader changes? 61
Yet, rather than facilitating the telling of her personal story,
the process of litigation distanced her from it. 262 Questions of
fairness to individuals became questions involving "a utilitarian
calculation of the public good. 263 When she sought to invoke
collateral estoppel, she was answered with arguments that its
257. See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979).
258. Id. at 2. See also id. at 29-44.
259. 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
260. Id., quoted in R. LEAvELL, J. LovE, & G. NELSON, supra note 253, at 499.
261. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw chs. 3 (judicial process), 5 (legislative process)
(tent. ed. 1958). Compare Fiss, supra note 269 (arguing that the essence of adjudication
is the articulation of public values, or law declaration, rather than dispute resolution)
with Lindgren, supra note 1, at 753-54 (arguing that courts are the best institutions for
resolution of individualized disputes). As Hart and Sacks stress, however, courts obvi-
ously perform both functions, law declaration and dispute resolution. H. HART & A.
SACKS, supra note 366-68.
262. See Lindgren, supra note 1, at 723-27.
263. Id. at 711.
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use "could spawn a massive increase in the number of lawsuits
initiated each year;" 2 that "deleterious economic effects will re-
sult thereby;"261 5 and that "the interests affected adversely will
include not only the commercial defendants' (including its
stockholders), but also those of its employees." 6 ' She never real-
ized she could be the cause of increased unemployment..26  She
was surprised to learn that the "primary argument against the
application of collateral estoppel is that its application is mani-
festly unjust in light of the fact that the doctrine can only work
in favor of plaintiffs."268 Why didn't anyone ask about fairness
to her? Why didn't a converse critique accompany doctrines
that could operate only in the defendant's favor?29 What had
happened to her individualized story?
So perhaps she, too, could reason in terms of fairness and
the public good. Yet when she framed her arguments in such
terms, in connection with seeking "market share" liability for
example, she was told that "since any solution to this problem
will have effects not only on the substantive legal issues, but on
industrial and ... economic concerns, it is an appropriate ques-
tion for legislation .... [T]he solution to the situation rests
more appropriately with the legislature. '270 The prospect of go-
ing to the same forum that enacted a date-of-sale statute of limi-
tation was, however, hardly rosy. The reality that the odds were
stacked against her on virtually every issue became clear soon
after she entered the DES labyrinth.
Unfortunately, the DES daughter's experience is not
unique.
From being acknowledged to be "public law in disguise," tort
law seems increasingly to be emerging simply as "public law."
That has occurred despite efforts such as Robert Keeton's to
explain the imposition of liability for non-negligent, risky con-
264. Weinberger, supra note 168, at 22.
265. Id. at 23.
266. Id. at 52.
267. Id. at 53.
268. Id. at 21.
269. For example, the general requirement that causal agents be identified with pre-
cision can only operate to the benefit of defendants who are members of an industry that
markets its goods without identifying characteristics. See Part H.B. supra.
270. Comment, Manufacturer's Liability Based on A Market Share Theory, supra
note 6, at 303, 316.
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duct as simply a variation in the meaning of fault and not "the
substitution of social responsibility for individual responsibil-
ity." Increasingly, concern transcends the individuals involved.
Individual interests are absorbed into a calculus which assumes
that some individuals may be excluded from receiving certain
benefits in order to achieve maximum social utility. That is
built into the economic analysis being used to determine the
cost of accidents, and is acknowledged by economists. Guido
Calabresi suggests "that justice is a totally different order of
goal from accident cost reduction," and Richard Posner de-
scribes the accident itself as a closed chapter in the enterprise
of preventing future accidents, and thus reducing accident
costs. "The issue becomes what is a just and fair result for a
class of actions." Such analysis has been finding its way from
the journals into court opinions.
George Fletcher, writing of fairness and utility in tort the-
ory, summarizes the pervasiveness of current concern for the
public that transcends concern for the individual in his "para-
digm of reasonableness." That paradigm which he sees as cur-
rently dominant, "provides the medium for tying the determi-
nation of liability to maximization of social utility.... ." As he
puts it, "[t]he fashionable concerns of the time are
instrumentalist.
27'1
The realities of DES litigation thus reflect the realities of
tort law. Although the complexity and far-reaching ramifications
of DES litigation suggest that it is unique, every element of such
litigation can be treated according to accepted principles of tort
law. The incongruity between the familiar nature of the DES ac-
tion's components and the judiciary's uneasiness when faced
with DES actions reflects judicial discomfort with the poten-
tially large liabilities that accompany mass tort situations and a
hesitance to afford compensation in this context.
These judicial qualms further compound handicaps the
DES plaintiff shares with all tort plaintiffs. Significant among
these is the atomized nature of the litigation, which results in a
tort compensation system in which "[n]o social reform or
scheme of compensation can be worked out. . . .The value is
limited to those persons who accept the prospect of an expen-
sive, unfriendly, impersonal experience in court. ' 272 As a "one-
271. Lindgren, supra note 1, at 746-47.
272. Id. at 762-63.
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shotter,"'27 3 the DES daughter sees her personal resources pitted
against the institutional reserves of an industry of "repeat play-
ers. '27 4 Even if she succeeds in obtaining a substantive change in
the law, the "RP's" can often neutralize that change by redis-
tributing their litigation resources.2 7 5 "The low potency of sub-
stantive rule-change is especially the case with rule-changes pro-
cured from courts. ' 271 Describing these broader realities of "the
basic architecture of the legal system, '277 Professor Marc Ga-
lanter has provided a more generalized treatment of the exper-
iences of plaintiffs like the DES daughter; ironically it is entitled
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead.27 8 His critique is pro-
foundly disturbing, especially for the tort plaintiff seeking indi-
vidualized treatment.
DES litigation may not be the proper context in which to
raise such dilemmas of our society; nevertheless two inescapable
inconsistencies flow from a critique of DES litigation on the
macro level. First, there is inconsistency in the courts' methodol-
ogies. Viewed generally as forums for individualized dispute res-
olution 2 7 and as limited in competency in ways a legislature is
not,280 courts nevertheless are not expected to engage in "direct
treatment"281 of the parties. Instead, questions of fairness be-
come questions of social or public utility. Second, there is an
inconsistency in theory. On the one hand, individualized "direct
treatment" by courts would seem to be consistent with the focus
on individualism that pervades our classic liberal philosophy28 2
and its capitalist economic system.2 8 Yet arguments in court
273. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97-110 (1974).
274. Id.
275. Specific advantages of being a "repeat player" are listed in id. at 98-103. For a
discussion of limits on the abilities of "have-not" "one-shotters" in securing substantive
changes in the law, see id. at 135-149.
276. Id. at 149.
277. Id. at 95.
278. Galanter, supra note 273.
279. See note 261 and accompanying text supra.
280. Id. See also note 270 and accompanying text supra.
281. Compare Lindgren, supra note 1, at 749-58 with notes 262-263, 271 and accom-
panying text supra.
282. See generally R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARDS A CRITICISM OF
SOCIAL THEORY 24-30 (1976). Cf. University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1976)
(Powell, J.).
283. See generally A. SmrrH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776); Abrahams, The Emer-
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tend to be based on the public suppression of individualism,
rather than protection of it.
The DES labyrinth thus may be viewed as a structure~built
upon these inconsistencies and reinforced by a tradition of male
dominance in both the medical and legal professions.28" "Wo-
men's problems" simply do not occupy a place of importance in
the scheme of legal things.285 But young women afflicted with
vaginal cancer are not mice who should be forced to wend their
ways through a legal labyrinth. The time for testing mice was
forty years ago.
gence of Critical Social Theory in American Jurisprudence: An Introduction of Profes-
sor Rosenberg's Perspective, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 39 (1980).
284. Male dominance of the legal profession is demonstrated by the fact that only
2,183 of 54,265 law students in 1964 were women, compared with 38,627 of 122,801 law
students in 1979. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1980-82 PRE-LAW HANDBOOK
24.
285. For example, under present constitutional doctrine race discrimination is
"strictly scrutinized" while gender-based discrimination is tested by the more lenient
"middle-tier" analysis inaugurated by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). Ironically, the
United States Supreme Court has held that discrimination against pregnant women does
not even constitute gender-based discrimination, although only women can become preg-
nant, and so discrimination against pregnant women is tested by the most lenient "ra-
tional basis" mode of equal protection analysis. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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